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Since 1 January 1999 the ECB has conducted a single monetary policy in the euro
area, but the mechanisms by which and the extent to which monetary shocks are
transmitted into prices and real economic activity may vary from country to
country. This paper investigates how and to what extent the impact of monetary
policy depends on national features of financial systems. The main interest is in
examining whether the bank lending channel of monetary policy results in
asymmetric loan supply reactions on the aggregate level across countries.
The variety of transmission mechanisms suggests that the potency of
monetary policy may depend on several country-specific factors. On the basis of
descriptive analysis, the present Member States seem to differ considerably in
terms of their financial systems. The econometric analysis using aggregate data on
a panel of twelve countries supports the view that some of these differences may
lead to cross-country asymmetries in responses to the common monetary policy.
In particular, a larger size and a lower degree of capitalisation of a banking sector
are found to strengthen the bank lending channel on the aggregate level.
Key words: EMU, monetary transmission, bank lending channel, panel data
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Kansallisten rahoitusjärjestelmien vaikutus maiden
välisiin eroihin euroalueen rahapolitiikan
välittymisessä




Voimakkuus ja mekanismit, joilla EKP:n harjoittama euroalueen yhteinen rahapo-
litiikka välittyy hintoihin ja reaalitalouteen, voivat vaihdella maittain. Tässä tutki-
muksessa tarkastellaan, missä määrin rahapolitiikan vaikutukset riippuvat kansal-
listen rahoitusjärjestelmien ominaisuuksista. Mielenkiinto kohdistuu erityisesti
kysymykseen, johtaako rahapolitiikan pankkiluottokanava maakohtaisiin eroihin
aggregaattitason luotontarjontareaktioissa.
Rahapolitiikan välittymiskanavien moninaisuuden vuoksi rahapolitiikan teho
voi riippua useista maakohtaisista tekijöistä. Kuvailevan tilastoaineiston vertailun
perusteella euromaiden rahoitusjärjestelmissä on huomattavia eroja. Paneeliaineis-
toon perustuva ekonometrinen analyysi tukee käsitystä, että osa näistä eroista voi
johtaa maakohtaisiin eroihin rahapolitiikan vaikutuksissa. Tulosten mukaan pank-
kisektorin suuri koko ja huono pääomitus vahvistavat luotonantokanavaa aggre-
gaattitasolla.
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1 Introduction
Since 1 January 1999, along with Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), the European Central Bank (ECB) has conducted a single monetary
policy in the Member States
1. Nevertheless, despite common monetary policy
actions, the mechanisms through which the actions are transmitted into the real
economy and the extent to which they affect output and prices may vary from one
country to another, and even over time within the same country. Countries with
diverse business cycles and different economic and financial structures tend to
respond asymmetrically to monetary policy shocks of a given type and size.
Thereby, to be able to optimise the timing and magnitude of intended monetary
policy actions, the monetary authorities should be aware of the extent to which the
present twelve Member States differ from each other. Since considerable
distributional differences in output costs of lowering inflation would impose
adjustment requirements on other economic policies and could ultimately create
political tensions between countries among the Union, the degree of asymmetry is
a matter of key importance for the future success of the common euro area
monetary policy.
Monetary transmission has long been a research topic of great interest in
macroeconomics and the origins of the basic theoretical framework date back to
times of Hicks and Keynes in the 1930s. However, since then both the theories
and empirical methods have widened and deepened considerably, and it is only
recently that the focus has been rather on uniform monetary shocks and different
transmission mechanisms than on asymmetric shocks and their final effects across
countries. In particular, after the outset of Stage Three of EMU, there has been a
wave of extensive empirical research in Europe and many papers dealing with the
pros and cons of the common monetary policy have emphasised differences in
transmission channels across the Member States. For example, within the ECB
and the national central banks, plenty of research has lately been conducted using
different data and various methodologies, including structural and VAR macro
models for the euro area and the national economies and panel micro data
analyses of bank and nonfinancial corporate sector behaviour.
In many of the past studies concerning EMU, differences in financial
structures across the Member States contribute to explaining cross-country
differences in the monetary transmission mechanisms. A common conclusion is
                                                
1 Throughout this study, the term ‘Member State’ refers to an EMU member country, ie to an
European Union (EU) member country which has adopted the single currency, euro. At present,
EMU – also referred to as the euro area – consists of twelve of the fifteen EU countries: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (as from 1 January 2001), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. EU member countries outside EMU comprise Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.8
that the national institutional environment, in which finance – both intermediated
and direct – takes place, does matter for the monetary transmission process, and
that so does also the household and nonfinancial corporate sector behaviour
within the specific environment. The country-specific financial system has thus
been found to have a significant effect on the channels through which and
ultimately on the extent to which the national real economy responses to monetary
policy shocks.
2
My view in the present study is close to that of Schmidt (1999), for example.
In accordance with his study, I address three issues as follows. First, I describe
how monetary policy is currently conducted in the euro area and how it, in theory,
should affect prices and the real economic activity. Second, I discuss how and to
what extent the impact of monetary policy depends on specific features of an
economy and, in particular, which features of a financial system are most
significant for the monetary transmission process. Finally, I aim at comparing the
current euro area countries and at discussing what kind of consequences
differences between them have for how the single monetary policy should and can
be conducted in a common currency framework.
I thus treat the issue from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by first
laying a broad theoretical foundation, on the basis of which the euro area national
financial systems are then being compared. I aim at widening the view of the
previous descriptive studies by exploiting data and findings from various different
sources. Moreover, Finland is of special interest, since so far it has commonly
been neglected in the euro area cross-country comparisons.
Despite aiming at a broad perspective, throughout the study the main focus is,
however, on the recent credit view of monetary transmission and, in particular, on
the operation of the bank lending channel. Thereby, also the econometric analysis
aims at providing empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy on lending
and particularly on the asymmetry of the supply shifts depending on country-
specific financial system characteristics. Using aggregate national data on a panel
of twelve EU countries, I estimate a dynamic reduced-form model of the bank
loan market. The main purpose is to examine the effect of size, liquidity and
capitalisation of the national banking sectors on the way in which the total lending
is adjusted to changes in national money market interest rates.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section two describes briefly
the ESCB’s present monetary policy strategy, its objectives and the main
                                                
2 The term ‘financial sector’ is used for institutions, which provide financial services to the
nonfinancial sectors of the economy, whereas the term ‘financial system’ comprises the demand
for and supply of financial services and the financial intermediaries and markets by which, and the
way in which, they are provided, as defined also in Schmidt (1999). ‘Financial structure’ in turn
refers to the complete organisation of the financial system, ie the interdependence of financial
markets, institutions and instruments in a given place at a given time (Goldsmith 1987).9
instruments used, and then discusses experiences from the first three and a half
years of the common monetary policy. Section three moves on by going through
the various channels through which monetary policy should in theory affect
inflation and the real economic activity. Section four presents findings of existing
econometric research on the euro area monetary transmission. In section five, I
present descriptive comparative statistics for a set of national financial systems,
with the objective of exploring for concrete differences in factors found relevant
in the preceding sections. On the basis of a previously developed model, section
six carries out a dynamic panel estimation for the national bank lending channels.
In the end, section seven gathers up the main findings and draws the final
conclusions.
2 The ESCB monetary policy strategy
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which consists of the European
Central Bank and the national central banks of the fifteen EU Member States
3,
constitutes the institutional and operational framework for the ECB’s monetary
policy. The formulation and implementation of the common monetary policy are
separated in the sense that the Governing Council of the ECB is responsible for
the former and the Executive Board for the latter
4. (ECB 2001) This section
describes briefly the conduct of the common monetary policy by presenting its
objectives and the instruments and procedures used in the light of past financial
and economic developments.
2.1 Objectives
The objectives of the ESCB are defined in the consolidated version of the Treaty
establishing the European Community (1997)
5. According to Article 105 in the
Treaty, the primary objective of the ESCB and its monetary policy is to maintain
price stability. A more precise definition in quantitative terms has been introduced
in an ECB press release on 13 October 1998, stating that price stability refers to a
                                                
3 The three EU Member States outside EMU retain their powers in the field of monetary policy
and are thus not involved in the conduct of the euro area monetary policy.
4 The Executive Board comprises the President, the Vice-President and four other members chosen
from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking
matters. The Governing Council in turn consists of all the members of the Executive Board and the
governors of the National Central Banks of the Member States, each with one vote.
5 The consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community incorporates
changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997.10
year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for
the euro area of below 2%
6. Thereby, it is noteworthy that the focus is on the euro
area as a whole instead of a country-specific or other regional perspective.
Furthermore, price stability is to be maintained specifically over the medium term,
since short-term volatility in prices cannot be controlled by means of monetary
policy. In fact, excessive short-term inference might rather cause unnecessary,
self-sustaining volatility into the real economy.
The quantitative definition of the objective of price stability is important for
the success of the monetary policy strategy, since it guides future price
developments by providing an anchor for the public’s expectations. Moreover, the
exact definition makes monetary policy more transparent and sets a benchmark
against which the public can hold the ECB accountable for its performance, thus
enhancing the credibility and effectiveness of the common monetary policy.
Having price stability as the ECB’s primary objective is based on the
argument that maintaining price stability is the best contribution that monetary
policy can make in the long run to economic stability and growth. According to
the ECB (2001), there are several ways in which price stability contributes to
achieving higher levels of economic activity and employment. First, it improves
the transparency of relative prices, thus helping the market to allocate resources
more efficiently and thereby raising the productive potential of the economy.
Second, the credible maintenance of price stability reduces the inflation risk
premium, which the investors demand in real interest rates to compensate them
for the loss of purchasing power in the long term. Third, maintaining price
stability credibly in the long run reduces also unnecessary hedging activities
against inflation. These second and third impacts as well should strengthen the
economic growth by enhancing efficient investment. Fourth, price stability
reduces the distortionary effect of tax and social security systems and, fifth,
prevents arbitrary redistribution of wealth and income, thus increasing social and
political stability. All in all, it is argued that, on average, economies with lower
inflation tend to grow more rapidly in real terms in the long run than countries
with faster rising prices. Nevertheless, despite the ECB’s primary interest on
inflation, also the short-run impact of monetary policy on output is considered in
the course of this study.
Since national inflation rates vary across countries for example due to
differences in productivity and growth and also depending on in which point the
countries are in their inflation cycles, it can be difficult for the monetary
authorities to assess the appropriate stance of the common monetary policy. In
fact, the European Economic Advisory Group (2002, 55–56), consisting of seven
European economists, has criticised the ECB’s inflation target for being possibly
too tight. The Group argues that as it is impossible to reach the target inflation rate
                                                
6 Both zero inflation and deflation contradict the ECB’s definition of price stability.11
simultaneously in each euro area country, a considerable amount of inflation has
to be accepted in some countries in order to avoid the risk of pushing others into
deflation. As prices typically rise more rapidly in fast growing less developed
countries than in countries of higher development but slower economic growth,
the inflation ceiling of 2% may put deflationary pressure on slow-growth
countries in particular. According to Sinn and Reutter (2001), keeping average
inflation below 2% could imply inflation rates as high as 3.5% in fast growing
countries, such as Finland and Ireland for the time being, but as low as 1% in
Germany, where both productivity growth and inflation have recently been the
lowest in Europe.
Monetary policy actions affect inflation in an uncertain, variable magnitude
and typically after a time lag of 1–2 years. It is therefore highly important that the
monetary authorities follow inflationary expectations continuously, since they can
be seen as a prediction for future inflation. Moreover, since inflationary
expectations affect pricing decisions and thus actual future inflation, it is
important that the expectations match the central bank’s inflation target
7.
Inflationary expectations are based on the expectations of future economic
developments and the future course of monetary policy but they can be influenced
also by announcements and implementation of the current monetary policy, if the
public considers the central bank credible.
The Governing Council of the ECB uses an analytical framework for
assessing risks to price stability in a systematic and organised manner. It has thus
adopted a forward-looking lasting strategy to ensure consistency and stability over
time. Consequently, there are two well-defined pillars, which are used to guide the
decision-making on monetary policy actions. The first pillar gives a prominent
role for money by stating a reference value of 4.5% for the annual growth of the
broad money aggregate M3. The reference value is consistent with the definition
of price stability, a stable annual growth rate of 2–2.5% of the euro area GDP, and
a decline of M3 velocity in the range of 0.5–1% per annum. Under normal
circumstances, deviations of actual monetary growth from the reference value
signal a threat to price stability, but the ECB is not committed to making any
mechanistic corrections over the short term. The first pillar focuses thus on
permanent rather than temporary changes in the velocity of circulation and
thereby on the monetary origins of inflation over the medium to long term.
The second pillar in turn emphasises the importance of monitoring and
analysing a wider range of economic and financial indicators to assess the risks to
price stability. For example, changes between demand and supply in goods and
                                                
7 Inflation reduces the purchasing power of money but also inflation lower than expected results in
costs as ex post real interest rates turn out to be higher than expected. Moreover, if inflationary
expectations have led to higher nominal wages, also ex post real labour costs are higher than
expected. (Kettunen 1995, ECB 2001)12
labour markets as well as conditions in financial markets are expected to affect
price developments over the short to medium term. Although decisions are made
from the viewpoint of the euro area aggregate level, the national central banks
contribute to the assessment by preparing background analyses and economic
forecasts on an individual country level.
According to the Treaty, without prejudice to the primary objective, the ESCB
should also support general economic policies in order to contribute to the
achievement of the objectives of the European Community. According to Article
2 in the Treaty, broader aims of the European Community comprise the promotion
of a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a
higher level of employment and social protection, equality between men and
women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a higher degree of
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among the Member States. In all of its activities the ESCB should
follow the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring
an efficient allocation of resources.
2.2 Instruments
In order to achieve its above-mentioned objectives, the Eurosystem
8 has available
three types of monetary policy instruments; it executes open market operations,
offers standing facilities and requires minimum reserves. The purpose and
conduct of each are described briefly below on the basis of Monetary Policy of the
ECB (2001) and The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three (2000) by the ECB,
unless stated otherwise.
2.2.1 Open market operations
Open market operations are conducted in financial markets, usually in the money
market, by the national central banks on the initiative of the ECB for the purposes
of steering interest rates, managing the liquidity situation in the market and
signalling the stance of the current monetary policy. With respect to their aim,
maturity, frequency and the procedures followed, open market operations are
divided into four categories of main refinancing operations, longer-term
refinancing operations, fine-tuning operations and structural operations. Each
                                                
8 The term ‘Eurosystem’ refers to arrangement whereby the ECB and the NCBs carry out the tasks
of the ESCB within the euro area (ECB 2001).13
operation is executed through a transaction, which either provides or absorbs
liquidity in the market. Transactions available are of following five types: reverse
transactions, outright transactions, the issuance of debt certificates, foreign
exchange swaps and the collection of fixed-term deposits.
The main refinancing operations are the most important open market
operations and the ESCB’s principal monetary policy instrument. They are
liquidity-providing operations, which are executed by the national central banks
through weekly standard tenders in the form of reverse transactions with maturity
of two weeks. In a reverse transaction a central bank provides funds to its
counterparties for a pre-specified limited period by buying assets under a
repurchase agreement or by granting loans against collateral.
From the beginning of 1999 to June 2000, the main refinancing operations
were executed via fixed rate tenders. Starting with the operation settled on 28 June
2000, they were switched into variable rate tenders with a multiple rate auction
procedure. The Governing Council of the ECB determines a minimum bid rate for
the operations approximately every two weeks. It is the key ECB interest rate,
since changes in it signal the stance of the ECB’s monetary policy and affect
short-term interest rates in the euro area money market. Furthermore, since the
ECB has a monopoly over the issuance of base money, it can efficiently influence
the overall conditions in the money market.
According to Estrella and Mishkin (1997), monetary tightening raises not only
money market rates but typically also long-term interest rates but less than the
short ones. Thus, a rise in the official central bank rate usually not only raises the
yield curve but also makes the curve flatter by narrowing the spread between
short- and long-term interest rates. The rise in the short-term market interest rates
results from the tightening of credit conditions, whereas the effect on long-term
interest rates depends also on long-term ex ante real interest rates and the
credibility of the central bank’s monetary policy, ie on the effect on inflationary
expectations. Basically, the more credible is monetary policy, the less long-term
interest rates should rise due to a rise in the central bank rate. However, if the rise
in the policy rate is considered insufficient to control the future inflation, the yield
curve may even become steeper as long-term interest rates rise more than the
short ones.
The effect of interest rates on inflation and inflationary expectations is based
on the pure expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates and the
Fisher equation. According to the former, any long-term interest rate can
technically be thought of as a geometric average of present and expected future
short-term interest rates
9. Consequently, the short-term interest rates, on which the
                                                
9 For example  , n
n t , 1 n t 2 t , 1 t 1 t , t n t , t ) f 1 )...( f 1 )( r 1 ( r 1              where a n-year spot rate 1 + rt,t+n
equals the geometric average of a 1-year spot rate 1  +  rt,t+1 and expected future 1-year rates
1 + ft+1,t+2,..., 1 + ft+n–1,t+n for the following n – 1 years.14
monetary authorities have the greatest impact through the central bank rates,
affect also the overall level of interest rates in the financial markets. Moreover,
long-term interest rates can be seen as reflecting present expectations of the future
development of short-term interest rates. The Fisher equation in turn is based on
the idea that nominal and real capital are perfect substitutes as investments but the
nominal capital must yield in addition to the real rate of return also a
compensation for the expected loss in the purchasing power of money
10.
Combining the two theories results finally in the idea that the expected future
nominal interest rate implied by the nominal term structure of interest rates
reflects expectations of the sum of the future inflation and real interest rate.
11
Open market operations are considered to have several advantages over the
other tools of monetary policy. First, open market operations occur at the initiative
of the ECB, which thus has a complete control over their volume. Second, they
are both flexible and precise, since they can be used to any desired extent. The
suitable change in reserves or the monetary base can be achieved with a purchase
or sell of securities in any specific magnitude. Third, open market operations are
easily reversed, so if a mistake has been made concerning the optimal volume, it
can be easily corrected by conducting a reverse transaction. Fourth, open market
operations can be implemented quickly for the absence of administrative delays.
(Mishkin and Eakins 2000, 220–221)
2.2.2 Standing facilities
The national central banks offer for their counterparties two types of standing
facilities, marginal lending and deposit facilities, with the following three aims.
First, the former provides and the latter absorbs overnight liquidity in the markets.
Second, they signal the general stance of monetary policy and, third, bound the
overnight market interest rates – the former from above and the latter from
beneath. Thus, by setting the two rates at which the loans are granted and the
deposits remunerated by the national central banks, the Governing Council of the
ECB restricts the excessive volatility of short-term market interest rates and
thereby contributes to the overall money market stability. Under normal
circumstances, counterparties can take overnight loans and make overnight
deposits on their own initiative without a limit or other restrictions apart from the
requirement to present sufficient underlying assets for a loan collateral. In
practise, due to high borrowing costs and a low rate of return on deposits, credit
                                                
10 By Fisher equation, 1  +  it = (1 + rt)(1 + Et(t)) = 1  +  rt + Et(t) + rtEt(t)   1  +  rt + Et(t).
(Eg Copeland and Weston 1988)
11 For further details, see eg Browne and Manasse (1989), or Kettunen (1995) which provides
some empirical evidence for Finland.15
institutions use the standing facilities only if there are no other alternatives
available.
2.2.3 Minimum reserves
Minimum reserve system aims at stabilising money market interest rates and
creating or enlarging a structural liquidity shortage. It thus contributes to the
ability of the Eurosystem to operate efficiently. Within the minimum reserve
system, the ECB requires euro area credit institutions to hold minimum reserves
on accounts with the national central banks at the interest rate of the main
refinancing operations. The reserve requirement of an institution depends on its
reserve base, ie deposits, debt securities issued and money market papers on the
liability side of its balance sheet. Compliance with the reserve requirement is
determined on the basis of an institution’s average end-of-calendar-day reserve
holdings over a one-month maintenance period. The averaging provision aims at
contributing to the stabilisation of money market interest rates by giving
institutions an incentive to smooth temporary liquidity fluctuations.
2.3 Past developments
This section discusses the ECB’s monetary policy decisions in the first three and a
half years of the common monetary policy on the basis of the ECB (2001) and
Bank of Finland (2002a). In particular, changes in the key ECB interest rates are
assessed with respect to past developments in inflation and monetary growth. The
role of the general economic development in interest rate decisions is also
considered. Moreover, the focus is on EMU-wide aggregates in accordance with
the ESCB’s monetary policy strategy.
Figure 1 below shows past euro area interest rates daily from 2 January 1999
to 28 June 2002. Changes – both anticipated and actual – in the three key ECB
interest rates are reflected rapidly in the euro area money market rates. In
particular, both the overnight interest rate Eonia and the 1-month Euribor seem to
follow the ECB’s main refinancing rate very closely. Moreover, since 8 April
1999, the two interest rates on standing facilities have provided symmetrically an
upper and lower limit for the short-term market interest rates. In the short run, the
ECB interest rates seem to have been highly autocorrelated in the sense that they
were first raised seven times in a row between 14 April 1999 and 14 May 2001,
and since then they have been lowered four times so far (situation in the beginning
of December 2002).16
Figure 1. The key Eurosystem interest rates,

















Source: ECB and Reuters.
The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area (see figures 2 and 3)
is calculated as a weighted arithmetic average of the twelve national HICPs, using
private domestic consumption expenditures for the year t – 2 as weights. Table 1
below shows the distribution of the euro area GDP and the HICP country weights
as reported in the Eurostat’s NewCronos database. Both figures indicate that
Germany dominates the euro area aggregates rather clearly, accounting for nearly
a third of the totals. Also France and Italy stand out by these measures, whereas
even Spain and the Netherlands are considerably smaller. The rest of the countries
account together for less than 15% of the totals, so the individual contribution of
each of the seven smallest economies seems somewhat insignificant.
Table 1. (1) Distribution (%) of the euro area GDP in 2000
and (2) HICP country weights in 2002
AU BE FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES
1 3.1 3.8 2.0 21.4 30.9 1.9 1.6 17.8 0.3 6.1 1.8 9.3
2 3.2 3.4 1.6 20.4 30.6 2.5 1.2 19.3 0.3 5.2 2.0 10.3
Source: Eurostat, NewCronos.
Figure 2 below depicts the national annual inflation rates and the euro area
weighted average for the years 1999–2001. In 2001 all but France exceeded the
2% target rate, but since also in the other two large countries, Germany and Italy,
prices have risen rather moderately through the years, the average has remained
bearable. As shown in figure 3, also money growth has exceeded its reference
value rather constantly.17
Figure 2. Annual euro area inflation and inflation rates of































Source: ECB and Eurostat.
%
In early 1999, there was both upward and downward pressures to the euro area
price stability. Downside risks were mainly due to weaker consumer confidence
and decreased external demand as a result of the recent Asian and Russian crises.
On the other hand, money growth was strong (see figure 3 above) and credit to the
private sector growing fast, which suppressed the downside pressures. Also higher
oil prices and the depreciation of the euro against the US dollar (see figure 4
below) aroused some risks rather on the upside. However, inflation remained
relatively low, around 1% (figure 3), which gave the Governing Council of the
ECB an opportunity to lower the interest rates in order to boost the economic
growth and to reduce the anticipated future downward pressures on prices. On 8
April 1999 the ECB Governing Council decided to reduce the main refinancing18
rate by 50 basis points to 2.5%. At the same time, the interest rates on marginal
lending and deposit facilities were set at 1.5% and 3.5%, respectively.
In the second half of 1999, the external environment continued to improve
and also the euro area monetary and credit developments contributed to the
recovery of economic growth. Moreover, the exchange rate of the euro kept
weakening and oil prices continued to rise. It became evident that the risks, which
led to the precautionary interest rate reduction in April, were no longer present.
Consequently, on 4 November 1999 the policy interest rates were raised
symmetrically by 50 basis points each. The rise was aimed primarily at preventing
the prolonged high money and credit growth from pressuring prices upward and to
restrain inflationary expectations and uncertainty in the financial markets.



























Source: ECB and Reuters.
Developments in the first half of 2000 implied again increasing upward risks to
price stability in the euro area. Strong M3 growth and further economic recovery
combined with higher import prices due to the protracted depreciation of the euro
indicated significant price pressures. Moreover, low inflation in the past suggested
that ample liquidity had been progressively accumulated since the late 1999. To
suppress medium-term upward price pressures, the ECB interest rates were raised
by a total of 75 basis points on 3 February, 16 March and 27 April and further by
50 basis points on 8 June 2000.
In late 2000, upward risks to price stability continued to prevail despite the
past monetary tightenings. Both M3 and credit growth slowed down but rising oil
prices and the renewed depreciation of the euro pushed inflation above 2%.
Furthermore, expectations of greater economic activity and higher inflation in the
future increased the risk of second-round effects on consumer prices through
wage increases. As a result, the ECB interest rates were raised by 25 basis points
on 31 August and again on 5 October 2000. In addition, the ECB intervened in the19
foreign exchange markets in September and November in order to reduce the
risks, which the depreciation of the euro posed to the euro area price stability.














In early 2001, prospects for the world economy started to weaken considerably.
Growth slowed down simultaneously in the United States, the euro area and Japan
(figure 5). Consequently, both national domestic demands in the euro area and
exports to non-euro countries were dampened and investments declined.
Moreover, money growth had started to decelerate along with the past interest rate
increases. Also oil prices started to trend downward, but inflation still accelerated
mainly due to higher food prices. However, since the slower economic growth
eased medium-term upward pressures on prices, the Governing Council decided
to lower the minimum bid rate by 25 basis points to 4.50% in 15 May 2001,
despite the inflation being above its 2% target ceiling.
In late 2001, the inflation outlook improved and inflationary expectations
started to decline due to the slowing of energy and food price increases and a
modest appreciation of the euro against the US dollar. To strengthen the consumer
and industry confidence, the interest rates were cut by 25 basis points in 5
September and further by 50 basis points 19 September in the aftermath of the
New York terrorist attack. Also several liquidity-providing fine-tuning operation
were conducted in order to support the vulnerable financial markets. Since
economic growth continued to slower in the euro area due to diminishing exports
and investments, the Governing Council decided to lower the interest rates again
by 50 basis points in 14 November, decreases thus summing to a total 1.50
percentage points in 2001.
In the first half of 2002, growth was still slow and inflation near the upper
limit. Moreover, the public budget deficits of the major Member States were
further increasing, threatening to violate a maximum of 3% of GDP, mutually20
agreed on in the Growth and Stability Pact in 1997. Consequently, there was no
room for either expansionary monetary or national fiscal policies. The slow US
growth coupled with the strong appreciation of the euro made the picture even
gloomier, since it further dampened the already weak exports. Also the near-
future anxiety is related primarily to the further prolongation of the sluggish
economic growth, for example as a result of oil price increases.
All in all, the Eurosystem’s operational framework has been functioning
rather well since the beginning of 1999, contributing thus to the stability of the
euro area financial markets and thereby to the general economic growth. Liquidity
conditions and short-term interest rates have been steered in a smoothed fashion
using mainly open market operations and the minimum reserve system. It is seems
that, so far, despite the high money growth in the past, the ECB has managed to
prevent short-term price fluctuations from translating into severe medium-term
inflationary expectations. Moreover, developments in long-term interest rates
imply that the financial markets have considered the ECB’s commitment to price
stability credible.
The past policy rate reductions indicate that in times of both moderate
inflation and low inflationary expectations, the ECB has been rather active also in
accelerating economic growth by means of expansionary monetary policy.
However, due to the ECB’s strong commitment to its strategy of price stability,
remedies against the sluggish economic growth are very limited when inflation is
above the target. As it has been the case in the late 2002, the presence of upward
pressures on prices leaves the ECB totally unequipped to increase the growth
prospects of the area, let alone to stimulate the sinking world economy.
3 Channels of monetary transmission
By a broad definition, monetary transmission refers to the process through which
changes in monetary variables such as money supply, interest rates, exchange
rates and credit are transmitted into the real economic activity (eg Fase and de
Bondt 2000). Since the final impact of monetary shocks on economy is difficult to
forecast due to long and variable lags, understanding the different phases of
various monetary transmission mechanisms is crucial for the planning and
implementation of successful monetary policy actions. In accordance with its
strategy, the ECB focuses on how its monetary policy actions affect the euro area
economy in general and the price level in particular. Since – if there are no risks
to price stability – the ECB uses its monetary policy also for stimulating economic
growth in the short run, in what follows, the effects of monetary policy on
inflation and output are both discussed.21
Although the various transmission channels are described one by one in
greater detail below, it is important to acknowledge that they are inter-linked and
affect one another. The mechanisms may also change over time and differ from
one country to another, as is emphasised in later sections of this study. Figure 6
below summarises the discussion that follows.





















According to Fisher’s quantity theory of money, a change in money stock has also
a direct impact on real economic activity. It is generally argued, however, that
monetary policy actions can affect real variables only in the short run, whereas in
the long run the effect of monetary policy on real output, employment and real
interest rates ceases to exist due to the so-called neutrality of money. Since a rise
in the money supply leads to excessive holdings of money, it also increases
demand for goods and thus raises their prices. Moreover, the general price level
rises due to higher inflationary expectations, since they affect asset prices and
price setting in product and labour markets. The higher monetary growth is thus
typically associated with higher inflation, leading to lower purchasing power of
money and thereby neutralising economic growth in real terms.
According to the monetarist view, real income is in the long run determined
primarily by supply-side factors, such as technology, population growth, the
flexibility of markets and the efficiency of the institutional framework of the22
economy. According to the ECB, it is in fact the task of fiscal and structural
policies to enhance the growth potential of the economy, whereas monetary policy
contributes to long-run growth only by maintaining price stability over the
medium term. (ECB 2001)
The indirect mechanisms through which monetary policy actions affect the
real economy can be divided into three types of channels and further into six sub-
channels: interest rate channel, three other equity price channels and two credit
channels. The interest rate channel and, in part, other equity price channels
represent the so-called money view, whereas credit channels are often referred to
as the credit view of the monetary transmission process. The two confronting
views differ in particular in respect to the role they give to the financial
intermediary sector. In the following, key assumptions behind the two views are
compared on the basis of Cecchetti (1995), Hubbard (1995), Kashyap and Stein
(1997) and de Bondt (1999).
3.1 Money vs credit view
In the traditional money view, interest rate and exchange rate movements are
assumed to affect directly the components of aggregate demand, which in turn is
considered to determine output in the short term under fixed prices. All in all, the
money view focuses on how output responses to monetary policy actions on the
aggregate level. Moreover, according to the view, capital markets are perfect and
there exist only two types of financial assets: ‘money’, which serves as a medium
of exchange, and ‘bonds’, which for the sake of simplicity are assumed to cover
all other assets, such as bonds, bank loans and other debt instruments, not used for
transaction purposes. Monetary authorities control the supply of money and by
adjusting the quantity of money relative to other financial assets they affect also
relative asset prices. Money is thus seen as the key financial variable affecting the
real economic activity in the monetary transmission process. Thereby, besides
issuing demand deposits, ie creating money through the liability side of their
balance sheets, banks have no special role in the money view monetary
transmission mechanism.
The more recent credit view, on the contrary, assumes that monetary policy
works through the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Capital markets are seen as
imperfect due to information-related financial frictions and financial markets are
considered to incorporate at least three types of assets: money, bonds and bank
loans. The functioning of the channel is based on the idea of supply of bank loans
being sensitive to monetary policy actions. Furthermore, it is assumed that bank
loans do not have any perfect substitutes, for which reason some corporate
investment and consumer spending, which are to be financed with credit, decrease23
if the supply of loans is reduced. In contrast to the money view, the credit view of
monetary transmission leads to distributional differences across borrowers due to
asymmetries in their financial positions and in their degree of bank-dependency.
3.2 Interest rate channel
The interest rate channel is conventionally presented on the basis of the simple
textbook version of the Keynesian IS-LM model. In the model, monetary policy
actions are transmitted into the real economy through the effect of interest rate
changes on spending and investment decisions. The functioning of the channel
relies thus on the interest rate sensitivity of demand.
The IS-LM framework was introduced first by Hicks in 1937, but the theory
has its origins in Keynes’ fixed-price model of output determination presented a
year before. The model is based on a set of simplifying assumptions, the most
important of which is the key Keynesian assumption stating that prices are fixed
in the short run. Consequently, aggregate supply is assumed to be infinitely elastic
at a given price level and output demand-determined. In the short run, the general
macroeconomic equilibrium is thus to be achieved by adjusting quantities
demanded instead of changing prices.
In the following, the formulation of a basic mainstream model is presented
briefly in accordance with Stevenson et al (1988, 2–12). After setting out the
basics, the money view monetary transmission process is described in this
simplified framework.
The IS-LM model
In the IS-LM model the economy is divided into two markets, the product market
for the current flow of real output and the money market for stocks of money and
other financial assets. Through interrelationships between the two markets
monetary and real factors affect one another. The IS curve is determined by the
product market and the LM curve by the money market, and together they
determine the general macroeconomic equilibrium.
In the product market, aggregate real expenditure AE consists of four
components: consumption C, investment I, government expenditure G and net
exports NX. With the exception of government expenditure, which is treated as
totally exogenous, each of the components of aggregate real expenditure can be
divided into two sub-components: to an autonomous sub-component and to a one
that depends on other factors in the economy. Thereby, besides its autonomous
component C0, consumption depends partly on the current flow of real disposable24
income Y – T0, where Y denotes real income and T0 a direct tax payment. The
marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income is assumed to be
positive and less than one. Similarly, in addition to their autonomous components
I0 and NX0, investment and net exports are assumed to be negative functions of
interest rate r and real income Y, respectively. By grouping together all exogenous
components into AE0 and endogenous variables into AE(Y,  r,  T0), the model
results in aggregate real expenditure of the form:
    
 , T , r , Y AE AE
Y NX NX G r I I T Y C C
NX G I C AE
0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 
       
   
(3.1)
with the properties 0 < AEY < 1, AEr < 0 and –1 < AET < 0, the lower-case letter
denoting the first partial derivative. The product market reaches its equilibrium
when the flow of real expenditures equals the flow of real income or output. The
equilibrium condition gives the equation
 0 0 T , r , Y AE AE Y   (3.2)
for the IS curve, defining thus the relationship between the level of real output and
the interest rate consistent with the product market equilibrium.
Components of aggregate demand, such as consumer durables, housing,
business fixed investment and inventory investment respond typically to changes
in medium and long-term interest rates (Hubbard 1995). Moreover, reasons for
which a fall in the interest rate tends to increase spending can be divided into
three distinctive mechanisms of cost-of-capital effect, substitution effect and
income effect. A reduction in the cost of capital increases firms’ optimal
investment by lowering the marginal cost of adding new capital to production.
Likewise, a lower rate of return on saving enhances investment through the
substitution effect, whereas income effect influences through wealth and depends
on whether the firm is a net saver or borrower.
In the money market, individual wealth holders allocate their portfolios
between two assets: money and bonds
12. The demand for real money balances L
depends on real income Y (reflecting both transactions demand and precautionary
motives for holding money) and the rate of interest on bonds r
13 (speculative
motive). The nominal money stock M0 is exogenously determined by the
                                                
12 The simplest version of the basic IS-LM model assumes that there is no banking system in the
economy. Consequently, all money is considered high-powered outside money. Bonds in turn refer
to risky assets, which bear a rate of return and cannot be used as a medium of exchange. The value
of the bond stock B is assumed to be independent of interest rate changes.
13 Since inflation is assumed to be zero, nominal and real interest rates are equal.25
monetary authorities. Under fixed prices, a change in nominal money stock is
associated with a change in real money balances and thus in real wealth.
In the money market equilibrium, the demand for real money balances equals
the outstanding real money stock. This condition determines the LM curve, which,
for a given money stock, gives the interest rate that is required at different income
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where LY > 0 and Lr < 0.
Monetary policy and the IS-LM equilibrium
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In the equilibrium, the income level Y* clearing the product market is associated
with an interest rate r* clearing the money market (point A in figure 7 below).26
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where parameters a1, b1, a2 > 0  and  b2  >  0 unambiguously. Consequently, the
higher the autonomous aggregate expenditure AE0, whether in the form of
consumption, investment, government expenditure or net exports, and the higher
the real money supply 
P
M0 , the higher should be the equilibrium level of income
(points B and C, respectively). The equilibrium interest rate in turn varies
positively with exogenous expenditure but inversely with money supply.
As already discussed, the monetary authorities can affect interest rates also
directly by raising or reducing the official central bank rates. Since for any single
country in the euro area the short-term interest rate is given by the ECB, in this27
context the LM curve can be thought of as being flat at any given point in time.
Consequently, the equilibrium level of output is determined by the IS-curve.
To outline the role of interest rate changes in the monetary transmission
process further, the basic mechanism of the IS-LM model can be simplified into
the following schematic by Mishkin (1996):
    Y I r M , (3.9)
where expansionary monetary policy leads to a fall in the real interest rate, which
in turn causes a rise in investment and in part in consumption (consumer
durables), thereby leading to an increased aggregate expenditure and output in real
terms in the short run. In the long run as prices adjust, increased demand for
goods due to excessive holdings of money leads to higher prices in the product
market. Thus, in the long run the increased real output is reduced by the
inflationary effect of expansionary monetary policy. Correspondingly, monetary
tightening restrains demand and contributes to price stability.
In theory, interest rate changes should have greater impact in countries with
high investment requirements. Consequently, Guiso et al (1999) use investment
per GDP as a proxy for the national interest rate sensitivity. As shown in table 2
below, by this measure, monetary policy should have strongest output effects in
Portugal and Austria and the slightest in Sweden, the United Kingdom and
Finland. However, since the ratio varies only from 17% to 24% in the euro area,
differences between most of the countries seem rather small.
Table 2. Gross fixed capital formation as a % of GDP,
averaged from 1994 to 1998
AU BE FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES DK SE UK
23 20 17 19 22 20 19 18 22 19 24 21 19 15 17
Source: Calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
As discussed above, the IS-LM model assumes imperfect price adjustment.
According to Guiso et al (1999), cross-country differences in the degree of price
rigidity may lead to different patterns of output adjustment to common monetary
shocks. Moreover, they argue that, since legislation governing the firing and
hiring of employees in Europe makes wages rather rigid and since labour costs
account for a major portion of total costs, labour market frictions can be used as a
measure of the rigidity. Table 3 below reports a summary indicator of strictness of
employment protection in the EU countries and in parenthesis rankings among 26
OECD countries, the score and the ranking both increasing with the strictness.28
Table 3. A summary indicator* of the overall strictness of
employment protection legislation
AU BE FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES DK SE UK
2.3 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.6 3.5 1.1 3.4 2.2 3.7 3.1 1.5 2.6 0.9
(15) (16) (11) (21) (20) (24) (5) (23) (13) (26) (22) (8) (18) (2)
* A weighted average of indicators for regular labour contracts, temporary contracts and
collective dismissals in the late 1990s.
Source: OECD (1999).
Figures indicate that the strictest employment protection is offered in the southern
Europe, whereas the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark are the least
regulated countries. The remaining countries seem fairly similar, so if labour
market frictions are considered to be the key determinant of future cross-country
differences in price and wage flexibility, differences between continental
economies appear rather small. According to Guiso et al, the move to a single
currency should not directly or immediately change the contractual framework
governing the labour market.
The traditional interest rate channel is criticised for its several omissions.
First, it neglects the adjustment of other asset prices. Second, it does not take into
account the accumulation of financial assets. Third, the model operates with one
interest rate only, while in practise demand for money is typically associated with
a short-term interest rate and investment with a long-term interest rate. Fourth, the
model does not give any role for financial intermediaries. Fifth, all financial assets
other than money are treated as perfect substitutes for each other, and sixth, the
model does not distinguish between transitory and permanent disturbances.
(Meltzer 1995) In what follows, these simplifications are somewhat relaxed, in
particular by broadening the range of assets available.
3.3 Other asset price channels
Instead of focusing on one asset price only, namely the interest rate, the other
asset price channels take into account the effect of changes in exchange rates,
equity prices and land and housing prices.
3.3.1 Exchange rate channel
Changes in exchange rates influence the real economy due to their effect on net
exports through import and export prices. When the domestic real interest rate r
falls relative to foreign rates due to an increase in domestic money supply M,29
domestic deposits become less attractive relative to deposits denominated in
foreign currencies. This leads to a fall in the value of domestic deposits relative to
other currency deposits, that is, to a depreciation of the domestic currency. The
lower value of the domestic currency makes domestic goods cheaper than the
foreign ones, thus increasing exports and decreasing imports. A rise in net exports
NX in turn results in a rise in domestic output Y. In accordance with Mishkin
(1996), the mechanism can be presented in the form of the following schematic:
     Y NX E r M , (3.10)
where E denotes the exchange rate expressed in terms of domestic currency (euro)
per foreign currency.
According to the ECB (2001), changes in exchange rates affect inflation in
three ways. First, for example depreciation of euro tends to raise prices of
consumption goods imported from outside EMU, thus accelerating inflation
directly. Second, higher prices of imported inputs lead to higher prices for final
goods as well. Third, depreciation of euro makes the domestically produced goods
more competitive in terms of their prices on world markets. Since this tends to
increase the external demand from outside EMU, also the aggregate demand and
overall inflationary pressures are consequently increased in the euro area
economies.
Since the exposure to exchange rate changes depends on the degree of
openness of the economy, the channel is more effective for small open economies
than for large closed currency areas. Basically, countries which are more open
face more of the loss in competitiveness in times of tight money, but benefit more
from a terms-of-trade improvement along a monetary expansion. Thus, the
strength of the exchange rate channel depends on one hand on the distribution of
external trade across countries and, on the other, on the volume of net exports
relative to GDP.
Schmidt (1999) argues that the exchange rate channel plays a rather small role
in the euro area, since there a considerable share of foreign trade is carried on
between the Member States. For the entire euro area, both exports to and imports
from countries outside EMU amounted to 16% of GDP in 2000. However, as
shown in the first column of table 4 below, the relative importance of extra-EMU
trade differs greatly from one country to another. For example in Ireland exports
to outside EMU accounted for nearly a half and in Austria almost a third of GDP,
whereas in France, Germany and Spain the share was less than 10%.
Furthermore, there are considerably cross-country differences as to the
distribution of exports and imports and thereby in the degree of exposure to
foreign currencies. The euro exchange rates against the US dollar, the yen and the
British pound are usually the ones most closely followed, but as shown by the last
column in table 4, the share of trade with the rest of the world – classified here as30
the ‘other’ – is also far from being negligible. For example a half of total exports
from France are directed to outside EU, the United States and Japan. Trade with
Japan plays in fact a minor role in all Member States, whereas the United States is
an important importer at least from Ireland, Italy and Finland.
Table 4. Openness of EU countries in 2000
Distribution (%) of exports (imports) by trading partner Exports
(imports) to
(from) outside









AU 29 (30) 62 (59) 13 (11) 6 (7) 1 (3) 18 (20)
BE-LU* 18 (15) 44 (47) 23 (21) 6 (4) 3 (1) 23 (26)
FI 17 (15) 44 (44) 13 (11) 10 (7) 2 (4) 31 (34)
FR 6 (12) 35 (50) 8 (8) 5 (3) 1 (3) 50 (35)
DE 8 (12) 59 (57) 11 (10) 5 (4) 1 (2) 24 (27)
GR 13 (12) 48 (54) 13 (10) 9 (7) 2 (2) 28 (26)
IE 48 (40) 40 (26) 23 (36) 17 (16) 4 (4) 16 (18)
IT 12 (11) 44 (48) 11 (8) 10 (5) 2 (3) 33 (36)
NL 23 (37) 63 (38) 15 (12) 4 (12) 1 (5) 16 (33)
PT 16 (14) 55 (64) 7 (5) 5 (4) 1 (2) 32 (26)
ES 8 (12) 66 (67) 14 (8) 6 (3) 0 (2) 13 (19)
DK 25 (18) 34 (36) 22 (26) 8 (5) 2 (4) 35 (30)
SE 23 (16) 41 (49) 15 (16) 9 (7) 3 (3) 32 (25)
UK 9 (13) 53 (46) 4 (3) 16 (13) 2 (5) 25 (33)
* Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat, NewCronos.
3.3.2 Equity price channels
Equity price channels are based on the sensitivity of equity prices to interest rate
changes in the financial markets. Channels through which changes in equity prices
affect the real economy can be divided into three distinctive mechanisms: Tobin’s
q theory of investment, wealth effects on consumption, and housing and land price
channels. Each mechanism is described in greater detail below.
Tobin’s q theory of investment
Tobin’s q theory of investment describes a channel by means of which monetary
policy actions affect the real economy through changes in share prices. By
adjusting monetary policy, the monetary authorities are able to influence the
allocation and amount of private spending. According to the monetarist view,
after a monetary expansion, increased holdings of money are reduced by the
private sector through increased investments in alternative financial assets, such31
as publicly traded shares. Alternatively, in accordance with the Keynesian view, a
similar effect can be achieved through the substitution effect by reducing interest
rates directly and thereby making bonds less attractive investments relative to
buying and holding shares. (Mishkin 1996) In any case, relative prices are
changed and the increased demand for equities raises share prices, which
according to the theory affects investment decisions.
In his money-capital model, Tobin (1969) defines q as the ratio of the market
value of existing capital assets to their current replacement or reproduction cost.
This is equal to comparing a firm’s total market value to the replacement cost of
its total physical capital stock. The market value of a firm refers to the total
market value of its outstanding shares, which depends on the firm’s tangible and
intangible assets. It can also be thought of as the market’s best estimate of the
present value of the firm’s current and future profits. The physical capital stock in
turn comprises only the firm’s existing tangible assets, the value of which is seen
as the production cost of similar newly produced commodities.
The role of q in the investment theory is discussed further in Tobin and
Brainard (1977), which states that the two prices of the same physical asset, the
market value and the reproduction cost, can diverge significantly for extended
periods of time. Moreover, the market values of existing assets are more volatile
than the production costs of their newly produced counterparts. According to the
theory, investment decisions are made on the basis of the comparison of the two
prices, with the objective of maximising the present net value of the firm’s
outstanding shares.
Basically, an investment project is undertaken if and only if it increases the
value of the firm’s shares. Values of q above 1 stimulate investment in excess of
requirements for replacement and normal growth, because the firm then profits
from issuing equity for the purpose of buying new capital. Since the market values
installed capital over the cost of purchasing capital, the firm is better off after
investing the proceeds in new physical assets. The incentive is clearly the gain to
be made by the excess of market price over the replacement cost. Given the
diminishing marginal productivity, the firm continues to invest until the increment
market value gained from the investment is equal to its cost. (Tobin and Brainard
1977)
In equilibrium marginal q, the ratio of the market value of an additional unit
of capital to its replacement cost, is equal to 1. Hayashi (1982) has pointed out
that under certain conditions the average q as defined above equals marginal q.
These conditions are met when the firm is a price-taker in the output market with
constant returns to scale in both production and installation. If the firm is a price-
maker, average q is higher than marginal q by the amount of a so-called monopoly
rent. Since marginal q is not directly observable, average q is usually used as an
estimate for it. In general, however, it is marginal q that is critical when making
an investment decision.32
Mishkin (1996) has simplified the mechanism into the following schematic
indicating that higher money supply leads to higher equity prices Pe and thus to
higher q, which in turn increases investment and finally total output:
     Y I q P M e . (3.11)
On the contrary, values of q below 1 encourage selling off capital or buying used
capital instead of new. On the other hand, firms with low q’s are attractive
takeover targets themselves.
Wealth channel
The second equity channel functions through the effect of equity prices on wealth
and further on consumption. The idea is based on Modigliani’s (1971) life-cycle
model, according to which consumer spending depends on the lifetime resources
of consumers, consisting of financial wealth and human and real capital. Thus, as
equity prices rise, share-owning households become wealthier and increase their
current consumption. (Lettau et al 2001) In the short run, this increases the
aggregate real expenditure and further real output (Mishkin 1996):
     Y n consumptio wealth P M e . (3.12)
In the long run, however, increased consumer demand may fuel the inflationary
pressures in the markets and result in the higher price level in general, offsetting
thus the expansionary effect in real terms (ECB 2001).
Housing and land price channels
Both the Tobin’s q theory and the wealth channel described above apply also to
housing and land markets, where housing and land are considered equity. Housing
and land prices respond to monetary policy actions in the same way as share
prices through the effect of interest rates on relative asset prices. A fall in interest
rates leads to increased investments in assets other than money, such as land and
houses, thus raising their prices. In accordance with the Tobin’s q theory, an
increase in house prices raises their prices relative to their replacement cost,
which in turn raises the q for housing. A higher q stimulates housing production
and results thus in higher aggregate demand and finally in greater output. On the
other hand, since housing and land account for a large amount of private sector33
wealth, rises in their prices increase wealth and therefore also consumption,
aggregate demand and finally output. (Mishkin 1996)
3.4 Credit channels
Gurley and Shaw (1955) were among the first to advocate the overall interaction
of financial and real activity and, in particular, the role of financial intermediaries
as creditors as opposed to the conventional view of the money supply process.
Gurley and Shaw argued that developed and well-functioning financial markets
contribute to the general economic growth by enhancing investment through
extending borrowers’ financial capacity.
14
Credit channel theories are based on the idea that the monetary transmission
process is influenced by imperfections in the financial markets. Basically, credit
market frictions arise from asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders and lead to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Akerlof
(1970) introduced the adverse selection problem in his model of used cars market.
The general idea applies also to financial markets, since borrowers with the
greatest default risks seek loans most actively and therefore are the ones most
likely selected. Moral hazard in turn takes place after credit has been granted,
since the borrowers may then have incentives to engage in activities, which
increase their credit risks. Consequently, for fear of credit losses lenders may
choose to either cut their lending or to treat all borrowers as equally risky and
therefore to raise their overall return requirements. Both adverse selection and
moral hazard can thus lead to credit rationing. Likewise, when investors have
difficulties in distinguishing between profitable and unprofitable investments,
they may choose to invest less.
According to the credit channel theory, market imperfections result in an
external finance premium, a spread between the cost of raising funds externally
through an issuance of equity or debt and the opportunity cost of internal funds
generated through retained corporate earnings. The size of the external finance
premium reflects the cost to the borrowers due to both credit market frictions and
the principal-agent problem which leads to a spread between the expected return
received by the lenders and the cost faced by the borrowers.
Monetary transmission through credit markets is based on the effect of
monetary policy on the external finance premium. According to the theory, any
monetary policy action that raises or lowers open-market interest rates tends to
change also the external finance premium in the same direction. Thereby, a
monetary expansion that lowers short-term market interest rates tends to reduce
                                                
14 For a comprehensive literature survey on the evolution of credit channel theories, see Gertler
(1988).34
the wedge between self-financing and credit, whereas a monetary tightening
increases it.
Monetary policy actions affect the external finance premium through bank
lending and balance sheet channels. The bank lending channel focuses on the
effect of monetary policy on the supply of loans by banks, whereas the balance
sheet channel emphasises the impact of monetary policy on borrowers’ net worth
through the effect on their balance sheets and income statements. (Bernanke and
Gertler 1995, de Bondt 1997 and 1999) Both channels are considered in greater
detail below.
3.4.1 Bank lending channel
The bank lending channel is based on the effect of monetary policy on the
external finance premium through changes in the supply of bank loans, or more
generally, in the supply of intermediated finance. Despite the recent structural
change, with the banking sector losing its market share to non-bank financial
intermediaries, banks still remain the dominant source of finance in most of the
developed countries. Moreover, since banks have specialised in overcoming
informational problems and other frictions in the markets, they are expected to
have an important role in the credit view of monetary transmission process.
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995)
In order for the bank lending channel to operate, two assumptions must hold.
First, it is assumed that there are not any perfect substitutes to bank loans neither
for banks nor for borrowers. Consequently, if bank loans are reduced relative to
other sources of finance, bank-dependent borrowers face higher costs of
borrowing due to costs associated with finding a new lender and establishing a
solid credit relationship. In particular, households as well as small and medium-
sized firms depend on bank loans due to their lack of access to other forms of
finance. Large firms on the contrary often have the alternative to obtain direct
finance by selling bonds or issuing equity. Basically, the greater the degree of
bank-dependency of consumers and firms, the greater should be the effect of bank
lending on the real economic activity.
The second assumption states that monetary policy actions have a direct effect
on the supply or relative pricing of bank loans. According to the theory, monetary
tightening that drains reserves and hence deposits from the banking system, limits
banks’ access to loanable funds and thus forces them to reduce their lending.
Thereby, the potency of monetary contraction depends on the degree to which
banks are able to raise alternative funds to offset reserve fluctuations. Given the
informational frictions between banks and their providers of funds and the
imperfect substitutability of loans and other assets on the liability side of banks’35
balance sheets, the mechanism relies on the assumption that banks cannot easily
replace lost retail deposits with certificates of deposits or new equity issues.
Reduced loan supply leads to a rise in interest rates on lending, which in turn
raises the external finance premium for bank-dependent borrowers, as a result of
which their real activity is reduced. (de Bondt 1997, Bernanke and Gertler 1995)
Correspondingly, expansionary monetary policy increases bank reserves and
deposits, which in turn makes it possible for the banks to increase their lending.
The increase in bank loans leads to a rise in investment and to a lesser extent in
consumption and finally in output in accordance with the following schematic by
Mishkin (1996):
     Y I loans bank  deposits bank  M . (3.13)
However, according to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the traditional bank lending
channel has and most likely will lose some of its importance over time due to
financial deregulation and innovation.
Next, two formal models by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Stein (1995)
are presented for the bank lending channel. They both work through the effect of
monetary policy on bank balance sheets. The former is a simple extension of the
Keynesian IS-LM model, while the latter provides more micro foundations and
develops a framework for the bank asset and liability management in the presence
of adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers. The two models
differ in terms of their asset sets and thereby in the way in which they assume
banks to react to exogenous outflows of reserves and deposits in the aftermath of a
monetary tightening.
The key distinction between the models is that according to Stein, the
monetary authorities can directly affect both bond market interest rates and the
spread between bonds and bank loans even if households are indifferent between
holding deposits and bonds. This suggests that monetary policy can affect not
only firms that rely on bank loans but also those that finance themselves in the
open market. According to Stein monetary policy remains effective due to banks’
preferences for their balance sheet compositions, whereas in the Bernanke-Blinder
model the impact of monetary policy on bond market interest rates depends only
on household preferences and bond market interest rates become insensitive to
monetary policy if households are indifferent between assets.
Bernanke-Blinder model
The Bernanke-Blinder (1988) model expands the conventional IS-LM model into
an IS-LM-CC model by taking into account the bank loan market in addition to36
the money and goods markets. Consequently, the model operates with three assets
– money (or deposits) D, bonds B and bank loans L
s – between which borrowers
and lenders choose on the basis of interest rates on bonds and bank loans, i and 
respectively. As a distinction to the IS-LM model where bonds and bank loans are
implicitly seen as perfect substitutes, the Bernanke-Blinder model is based on the
assumption that customer-market credit and auction-market credit are imperfect
substitutes for both borrowers and banks. Imperfect substitutability between the
assets may arise for example from informational asymmetries, differences in
liquidity and higher transaction costs of raising funds in the open market.
Ignoring the net worth, the model simplifies bank balance sheets into the
form:
Assets Liabilities




where reserves R consist of required reserves D,  denoting the required reserve-
to-deposit ratio, and excess reserves E. The adding-up constraint, equalising
banks’ assets and liabilities, states the portfolio equation as follows:
            1 D E L B D L B E D
s s . (3.14)
Desired proportions of loans, bonds and excess reserves on bank balance sheets
depend on the rates of return on loans and bonds
15, with positive own interest
elasticities and negative cross elasticities. The bond stock, supply of loans and the
stock of excess reserves can thus be denoted as:
   ) 1 ( D ) i ( E and ) 1 ( D ) i , ( L , 1 D i , B
s               , (3.15)
where  < 0, i  > 0,   > 0, i < 0 and i < 0.
Demand for bank loans by borrowers is assumed to depend negatively on the
interest rate on loans, L < 0, and positively on the rate of return on bonds, Li > 0,
and the gross national product, Ly > 0:
 y , i , L L
d   . (3.16)
                                                
15 The rate of return on excess reserves is considered to be zero. For simplicity, the model assumes
also that banks’ demand for excess reserves depends only on the rate of return on bank loans, not
on the interest rate on bonds.37
The loan market equilibrium exists when loan demand and supply are equal:
             1 D i , y , i , L L L
s d . (3.17)
The money market in turn is described by a conventional LM curve. Ignoring
cash, the money market establishes, in fact, the market for deposits. The supply of
deposits can be derived from the equation for bank reserves:
       R i m
1 i
R
D 1 D i D E D R 
    
           , (3.18)
where m(i) denotes the so-called money multiplier by which deposits increase for
every one-unit increase in reserves.
The demand for deposits results from the transactions motive and is assumed
to depend on the interest rate on bonds, GNP and total wealth. Total wealth is,
however, treated as constant and therefore ignored in the model. Equating demand
for and supply of deposits gives the condition for the money market equilibrium:
   R i m y , i D  , (3.19)
where Di < 0, Dy > 0 and mi > 0.
By Walras’ law, demand for money and bonds must equal the total wealth
minus demand for bank loans. Consequently, L(, i, y)  and  D(i, y)  determine
implicitly also the non-bank private sector’s demand function for bonds, but it
needs not to be considered in this context.
In the goods market, the equilibrium condition is characterised by the
conventional IS curve:
   , i Y y , (3.20)
where Yi < 0 and Y < 0, stating that output varies negatively with the interest
rates on both bonds and bank loans.
Using money market equation (3.19) to replace D by m(i)R on the right-hand
side of the loan market equation (3.17) results in:
       R i m 1 i , y , i , L       . (3.21)
Solving this for the interest rate on loans gives:
 R , y , i    , (3.22)38
where i > 0 assuming the money multiplier is not too inelastic, y > 0 and R < 0.
Rewriting the LM curve (3.19) and modifying the IS curve by substituting
(3.22) into (3.20) gives finally the equations for the model’s LM and CC
(commodities and credit) curves:
 R , i M y  LM (3.23)
  R , y , i , i Y y   CC (3.24)
As shown in figure 8 below, the CC curve is downward-sloping and the LM curve
upward-sloping in the i,y space. Relationships between the two functions establish
the framework, in which monetary policy operates through the interest rate and
bank lending channels.
Table 5 below summarises the model’s comparative static properties, ‘+’
denoting an increase and ‘–’ a decrease in the variable considered. Changes in
both money stock and outstanding credit seem to be good qualitative indicators of
future output movements except in times of significant shocks to either money or
credit demand (highlighted with a darkened background).
Table 5. Effect of different types of shocks on output and
monetary variables




Bank reserves + + + + – –
Money demand + – +–++
Loan supply + + + + + –
Loan demand + ––+–+
Commodity demand + + + + + +
Source: Bernanke and Blinder (1988) (apart from the last column).
The model regards bank reserves R as the central bank’s monetary policy
instrument. Since a rise in bank reserves increases supply for both money and
credit and thus shifts both the CC and LM curves to the right, the final effect on
interest rates is ambiguous. The outcome depends on the extent to which the two
curves shift relative to each other; see figure 8 below. This ambiguity can,
however, be removed by making the following assumptions. First, the income
elasticities of the demand functions for money and loans are not too different.
Second, the absolute elasticities of loan supply and loan demand with respect to
the interest rates on bonds and bank loans are not too different and, third, the
interest elasticity of the money multiplier is not too large. Consequently, an
increase in bank reserves can be assumed to increase output and to reduce the rate39
of return on bonds unambiguously. Likewise, monetary tightening decreases
output and raises the interest rate on bonds.





A rise in money demand shifts the LM curve upward and to the left along a fixed
CC curve. Similarly, negative money demand shocks shift the LM curve
downward but keep the CC curve in place. Thereby, the rate of return on bonds
varies positively and output negatively with changes in demand for money.
An increase in the proportion of loans in total bank assets, ( ), shifts the CC
curve upward and to the right along a fixed LM curve. A positive credit supply
shock leads thus to greater output and to a higher rate of return on bonds. A
decrease in loan supply on the contrary reduces both output and the interest rate
on bonds.
A rise in demand for bank loans, L( ), lowers money supply and increases the
amount of credit. It shifts the CC curve downward and to the left along a fixed
LM curve, thus reducing both output and the rate of return on bonds. A negative
credit demand shock leads to opposite reactions. Positive and negative
expenditure shocks through changes in commodity demand result in similar
effects, shifting the CC curve like the IS curve in the conventional IS-LM model.
According to the model, the CC curve reduces to the conventional IS curve
and the bank lending channel ceases to exist if bonds and bank loans are regarded
as perfect substitutes either for borrowers or lenders. The former occurs when the
demand for loans is perfectly elastic with respect to the interest rate on loans, ie
when    
d L , or when demand for commodities is insensitive to the loan rate,
Y = 0. The latter in turn requires that bonds and loans are perfect substitutes in
banks’ portfolios, ie that the credit supply is perfectly elastic with respect to the40
interest rate on loans,    
s L . Moreover, if money and bonds are perfect
substitutes, the LM curve becomes horizontal resulting in a liquidity trap but
monetary policy remains effective in the CC curve.
Adverse selection model
Also Stein (1995) has presented a formal model for the bank lending channel by
considering the bank portfolio choice under the potential for adverse selection
16.
His two-period partial-equilibrium model of bank asset and liability management
is based on the idea that asymmetric information between banks and outside
investors about the value of banks’ existing assets distorts the lending behaviour
by making it difficult for banks to raise funds with instruments other than
government-insured deposits. Stein thus contrasts the Romer and Romer (1990)
view which – by applying the Modigliani-Miller theorem
17 to banking firms –
states that banks can always insulate their lending decisions from deposit shocks
by raising funds from non-deposit sources of finance.
According to Stein, an adverse selection problem arises when banks are for
some reason forced to find non-insured sources of finance instead of issuing
insured deposits, the value of which does not depend on investors’ perceptions
about the banks’ assets and thereby on the perceived bank type. Thus, the model
relies on the idea that to the extent that the monetary authorities are able to control
the aggregate level of real insured deposits available to banks, they can affect also
the supply of loans.
The model simplifies bank balance sheets into the form:
Assets Liabilities
Reserves, R Deposits, M
New loans, L Equity, E
Old assets, K
Securities, S
Basically, the functioning of the model is based on banks’ decisions on their
optimal holdings of assets and liabilities at two points in time. The amount of new
loans granted (L), a buffer stock of securities held (S) and the amount of new
equity raised (E) are banks’ choice variables, whereas deposits (D) and therefore
required reserves (R) are determined exogenously by the monetary authorities.
                                                
16 The Stein (1995) study does not comprise the intermediary calculations presented in this work.
An alternative one-period version of the model is presented in Kashyap and Stein (1994).
17 For more details, see Modigliani and Miller (1958), who argue that the market value of a firm is
independent of the firm’s financial structure.41
New loans are assumed to bear a rate of return r, which can be interpreted also as
a spread between interest rates on loans and securities, since the rates of return on
instruments other than loans can all be fixed and normalised to zero.
According to the model, any securities held at time 1 can be liquidated
costlessly at time 2, whereas loans can be liquidated prematurely only to the
amount J and for a net cost of J
2. Since the costs are of the quadratic form, the
marginal costs are increasing (2J > 0). Furthermore, since of key interest in this
model is the way in which banks respond to a monetary contraction in the form of
a decrease in deposits, it is assumed that no new lending opportunities arise at
time 2, ie L2 = 0. To emphasise this, loans granted at time 1 are denoted by L
instead of L1. Thus, loans held at time 2 amount to L at the most.
Old assets refer to loans, which have been granted at some earlier point of
time but are still booked on banks’ balance sheets. The value of these assets is
assumed to follow a simple binomial process:
                           0
2K u
             0 uK
0 K                       0 udK
             0 dK
                           0
2K d
     1  t          2  t
Before there is any new information available, the value of the assets is denoted
by K0. An initial public signal, which reaches outside investors at time 1, can be
either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and consequently either raise or lower the value of the
assets, respectively. Similarly, the second public signal arrives at time 2, again
either increasing or reducing the value. Throughout the process, the up move
factor u > 1 is assumed to have a probability p and the down move factor d < 1 a
probability 1 – p.
Asymmetric information about the value of the old assets arises from the fact
that the bank management is always one step ahead of outside investors in terms
of their respective information sets. At both points in time, the bank management
observes the signal before the outside investors and before making their lending
and financing decisions for the present period. On the basis of the signals banks
are divided into good and bad ones. A ‘type G’ (for good) refers to any bank
whose private information either at time 1 or 2 leads its managers to expect an
increase in the value of the bank’s old assets when the next public signal is
released in public. Conversely, the management in a ‘type B’ (bad) bank expects
the bank’s asset values to decrease.









1 A , (3.25)
implying that the greater the up move factor is relative to the down move factor,
the stronger is the degree of informational asymmetry.
On the liability side of their balance sheets, banks have two sources of
finance: insured deposits and uninsured, non-deposit external finance. There are
several forms of uninsured external finance available to banks, all of which are for
simplicity assumed to be of the same priority in the model and therefore treated as
equity as a whole. Since E1 and E2 refer to incremental amounts of equity raised at
times 1 and 2 respectively, the total of E1 + E2 is raised by time 2.
M1 and M2 in turn denote banks’ stocks of deposits at times 1 and 2
respectively, so in the case of a monetary expansion the incremental amount of
deposits available to banks at time 2 would equal the difference of the two,
M2 – M1. Time-2 deposits are stochastic but after M1 is realised it is common
knowledge that they are uniformly distributed on




2              , where the parameter
 measures the persistence of deposit shocks and  their variance. Thereby, the
expected value of time-2 deposits is equal to M1 + (1 – )M, with M denoting
the long-term mean of deposits. Though stochastic, the amount of deposits is
assumed to be completely determined by the central bank’s monetary policy.
Moreover, in what follows, it is assumed that at time 2 all banks face an equal
exogenous outflow of deposits, ie M2 < M1, which tightens their financing
constraints
18. The model is thus used for describing the banking sector behaviour
under a monetary tightening.
To find a low-cost separating equilibrium, ie an equilibrium where the
quantity of external financed chosen by a bank reveals its type, the two-period
model is solved backwards, starting with time 2 and ‘type B’ banks. Type B’s
raise an amount of external finance that is large enough for them to avoid the
costly liquidation of loans, given their time-1 lending and financing decisions.
The model assumes that old assets do not require any new external funding, for
they have already been financed with non-deposit sources of finance. Therefore,
the financing constraint for type B’s at time 2 states that the sum of time-2
deposits and the new equity raised at times 1 and 2 must equal time-2 reserve








1 2 S L R E E M      . (3.26)
                                                
18 Since the inter-bank competition for deposits is not allowed in the model, there is nothing the
banks can do in order to offset the fall.43
The bank enters time 2 with loans of L
B, securities of 
B
1 S  and equity raised 
B
1 E.
When the value of time-2 deposits M2 is realised, the bank faces one of the two
alternative situations. If equity raised at time 1 and time-2 deposits together




1 L R M E    , type B’s can
continue to fund their loans without raising any new external finance at time 2,









1 L R M E    , banks are still short of funds even after selling off all
of their existing securities 
B
1 S . Thus, at time 2 type B’s are forced to raise an
amount of equity:





where 	 denotes the required reserve ratio, with 	M2 = R2.






2   , (3.28)
implying that type G’s are forced to liquidate loans by the amount J in order to
keep their time-2 financing constraint in balance. Consequently, profits of type
B’s exceed those of type G’s by the amount of the liquidation costs J
2.
Type B’s may, however, choose to mimic type G’s and raise equity only by
the amount 
G
2 E , if the profit that can be gained by selling overpriced equity
exceeds the costs of liquidating loans. Since the equity of a type B bank
pretending to be G is overpriced by a factor 
d
u
, the gain at time 2 equals the
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In the equilibrium, profits from switching to the type-G strategy are equal to the
loss due to liquidation. Thereby, the incentive constraint of type B’s not mimic
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Due to the potential adverse selection problem in time-2 external finance markets,
both types of banks face ex ante expected liquidation costs X at time 1, which
depend on the time-2 financing shortfall. Since at time 2 type B’s raise enough
external finance so as not to have to liquidate any loans at all, only G’s will incur
costs. Calculating with the minimum amount of deposits available at time 2, the
expected costs are of the form:
     
    ,   2 / M 1 M 1 E L pC
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(3.32)
where p is the time-1 probability of a bank being of type G at time 2 and C( ) is an
increasing convex function, with C(0) = 0. For a given M1, the expected costs can
be reduced by raising E1 relative to L, ie by holding a greater buffer stock of
securities S1 at time 1. In fact, by making the buffer stock large enough, the
expected liquidation costs can be ultimately driven to zero. Consequently, banks
choose to hold securities in their portfolios despite their lower (risk-adjusted) rate
of return compared to loans, since the loss in the yield is compensated by their
greater liquidity at time 2. As a result, there is a tradeoff between the two assets
and, since cutting loans is costly, the optimal time-1 response to a given financing
shortfall is to reduce both the securities holdings and lending.
Next, the model is solved at time 1. Banks are assumed to be monopolists in
the loan market and to face the following demand function for loans:
br a L
D   , (3.33)
where r is, as before, the rate charged to borrowers and b (> 0) a measure of the
elasticity of loan demand
19.
In the low-cost separating equilibrium, type B’s choose r
B so as to maximise
their interest income, ie the amount lent multiplied by the rate of return on loans:







r b ar max br a r max L r max
B B B     . (3.34)
                                                
19 This sort of loan demand schedule can be derived from optimisation on the part of borrowers by
assuming that they are price-takers and have output that is a quadratic function of the amount
invested.45
Taking the first and second derivatives gives the first- and second-order
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a br a L L
B B D       . (3.37)
At time 1, type B’s choose to raise an amount of external finance that is with
certainty enough also for the time-2 requirements regardless of whether the
deposits decline or increase:




2       (3.38)
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(3.39)
Consequently, securities holdings must satisfy
   
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1 E  is strictly positive, (3.40) holds with equality. Then, the greater is
the variance of the time-2 deposit shock, ie the greater is , the larger the buffer
stock of securities should be for type B’s at time 1. Moreover, the more transitory
the time-1 deposit shocks are in nature, ie the closer  is to zero, the more
sensitively the securities holdings should react to those shocks. In the case of
relatively permanent shocks, type B’s react by raising more external finance 
B
1 E
instead of reducing securities. Banks can thus use their buffer stocks of securities
for smoothing the use of uninsured external finance over time.46
Type G’s raise less external finance than type B’s at time 1 as well. As a
result, they invest less in both loans and securities and are therefore forced to
liquidate a part of the loans at time 2. The net costs of this to type G’s are equal to
the difference between the profits of type B’s and G’s and consist of liquidation
costs and losses in yield owing to a smaller stock of loans:
   .   X L r max L r E W
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  (3.41)
W( ) is a decreasing function, with    0 E W
B
1  . For type G’s their rate of return on
loans, r
G, can be calculated from the equilibrium:
b
L a
r L br a L L
G
G G G G D 
      . (3.42)
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Thereby, (3.41) can be rewritten into the form:
  
    .
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Analogous to time 2, the incentive constraint for type B’s to mimic type G’s states











1    . (3.45)
Finally, conclusions can be drawn about banks’ portfolio behaviour in the case of
a monetary contraction at time 1. Again, banks have three possibilities to cope
with the tightening. They can either reduce the supply of loans, raise non-deposit
external finance or sell off securities. The model has two important implications.
First, type G’s react to deposit outflows by cutting the lending. Thus, even the
presence of buffer stocks of securities on type G’s balance sheets does not lead to
loans being fully insulated from deposit shocks at time 1. Basically, the stronger47
the degree of informational asymmetry, the larger should be the effect of deposit
shocks on lending, ie for type G’s dL/dM1 < 0 and d
2L/dM1dA > 0.
Second, both type G’s and B’s react to a decrease in deposits by cutting their
securities holdings, ie dS/dM1 < 0. For type G’s, the impact of deposit shocks on
securities holdings can become either stronger or weaker when the informational
asymmetry A increases in magnitude. On the one hand, due to an adverse
selection problem at time 2, it is more attractive for high-A banks to hold large
buffer stocks of securities, since they are the ones most eager to avoid raising
external funds at time 2. This suggests that high-A banks value securities more
highly and are less willing to cut them as M1 falls.
On the other hand, the model implies that high-A banks cut their loans more
at time 1 than those facing less informational asymmetry. This in turn means that
the loan-security spread r rises by more for high-A banks, thereby making them to
rebalance their portfolios so as to put more weight on loans at the expense of
securities, ie to cut securities by more in response to a given deposit outflow. With
relatively inelastic loan demand, the movement in r is substantial, making the
latter effect dominant.
When the interest elasticity of loan demand b is high, it is more likely that
securities are more sensitive to deposit shocks in banks facing low informational
asymmetry, ie d
2S/dM1dA  <  0. Conversely, when loan demand is relatively
inelastic, it is more likely that banks facing higher informational asymmetry are
less sensitive to deposit outflows.
Extending the model to allow for inter-bank competition for deposits gives
rise to a situation where firms using direct finance are also affected by the
monetary tightening. Within perfectly competitive deposit markets, it is possible
for type G’s, who are more reluctant to raise uninsured external finance, to bid
deposits away from type B’s. With a common interest rate on deposits and bonds,
households are indifferent between holding them, so the only distinction between
the two comes from banks’ preferences due to the adverse selection problem. In
the extent to which the monetary authorities can drain reserves form the system,
they are also able to contract the supply of deposits to banks. Thereby, the relative
price of deposits rises, raising also the bond market rate. Type G’s, who are now
short of deposits, choose to lend less, which in turn raises the interest rate on loans
r faced by their customers. Consequently, both the rate of return on bonds and the
loan-bond spread are sensitive to monetary policy.
3.4.2 Balance sheet channels
The balance sheet channel operates through the effect of monetary policy on
borrowers’ net worth, determined on the basis of their balance sheets and income
statements. The functioning of the channel is based on the idea that any shock48
affecting borrowers’ financial position influences also their external finance
premium and the overall terms of credit the borrowers face in the markets.
Basically, the lower the net worth of borrowers, the greater is the degree of
adverse selection and moral hazard in lending to these borrowers and therefore the
greater is the external finance premium. Changes in credit conditions in turn affect
both lending and borrowing decisions and further borrowers’ investment and
spending decisions.
There are several ways in which monetary policy actions can affect
borrowers’ financial position, both directly and indirectly. In what follows, these
different channels are described in greater detail in accordance with Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) and Mishkin (1996).
Cash flow channel
A monetary contraction leading to higher short-term nominal interest rates i
increases interest expenses from borrowers’ outstanding short-term and floating-
rate debt. Increased interest payments in turn reduce borrowers’ net cash flow and
thus lower their net worth. Higher losses from adverse selection are due to lower
collateral values, whereas greater moral hazard results from borrowers’ lower
equity stakes. Moreover, the degree of adverse selection increases, since
economic agents who are willing to take the biggest risks are the ones most
anxious to borrow. Consequently, reduced lending by banks leads to lower
investment spending and thereby to lower aggregate demand and output.
Correspondingly, expansionary monetary policy with opposite effects can be
simplified into the following schematic:
, Y I lending hazard   moral   & selection    adverse
net worth flow cash  net  i M
    
   
(3.46)
reflecting the fact that a greater net worth enables borrowers to reduce conflicts
with lenders by offering more collateral to guarantee their loans or by financing a
greater share of their investments internally.
Asset price channel
Rising interest rates typically lower asset prices Pe and thus directly weaken the
borrowers’ net worth. A fall in asset prices reduces also the value of borrowers’
collateral and thus their creditworthiness. Similarly, declining interest rates tend to49
raise asset prices and strengthen borrowers’ financial position, thereby leading to
similar effects as above:
      Y I lending hazard   moral   & selection    adverse P M e (3.47)
Debt deflation
Also an unanticipated decrease in the price level P reduces borrowers’ net worth
through debt deflation by increasing the real burden of debt payments fixed in
nominal terms. Likewise, an unanticipated rise in the price level increases
borrowers’ net worth:
. Y I
lending hazard   moral   & selection   adverse P   ted unanticipa M
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(3.48)
This effect of unanticipated price fluctuations on output supports further the view
that the ECB should keep the price level as stable as possible in the medium term.
Moreover, it implies that deviations from the inflation target are undesirable in
both directions.
Financial gap
Monetary tightening can affect borrowers’ net worth also indirectly by increasing
the financial gap, ie the difference between borrowers’ uses and sources of funds.
If a firm’s customers reduce their spending for cost-of-capital or balance sheet
reasons, the firm’s revenues decline, while various fixed payments remain the
same in the short run. This weakens the firm’s financial position and
creditworthiness over time.
Household liquidity effect
The balance sheet channel applies equally to both households and nonfinancial
corporations. When stock prices Pe rise, share-owning households’ financial
position becomes more secure since the value of their financial assets rises
relative to their liabilities. Thus, the probability of financial distress decreases,
which in turn increases the willingness to purchase consumer durables and
housing C:50
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On the contrary, a higher likelihood of financial distress after a monetary
tightening reduces spending on illiquid real assets. Instead, consumers increase
their holdings in liquid financial assets, such as deposits, stocks and bonds, which
can be sold easily for their full market value in the case of a financial distress.
Exceptionally, the fall in output results here from households’ unwillingness to
consume, not from the credit rationing by banks.
4 Prior econometric evidence
This section provides an overview of the existing macro- and microeconometric
evidence, whereas descriptive empirical research is discussed in section five. To
begin with, some general issues are raised concerning the reliability and
comparability of studies, since for several reasons, knowledge of differences
between countries does not easily translate into robust conclusions about the
likely impact of monetary policy. For one thing, eg Kieler and Saarenheimo
(1998) have addressed the problem of identifying the causal effect of monetary
policy actions. As they point out, changes in the economy following a shift in the
stance of monetary policy may stem from the policy action itself or be due to the
underlying factors that spurred the action in the first place.
The results of different types of studies are difficult to compare due to
differences in methods and assumptions under which they have been conducted,
since models with dissimilar structures leave it unclear whether the results differ
only due to arbitrary modelling decisions. As Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998)
state, results for the same country can differ considerably depending on the model
used and, moreover, these differences tend to be larger than asymmetries found
across countries using a given model and method. Furthermore, models with a
uniform structure tend to yield smaller differences between countries than those
with a more idiosyncratic structure (Guiso et al 1999). In addition, even the
ranking of countries with respect to the impact of monetary policy has turned out
to be inconsistent across different types of studies, as is shown in table 6 in
section 4.1.
In particular, much of the existing empirical evidence is subject to differences
between national monetary and exchange rate regimes under which the countries
have operated in the past. According to Guiso et al (1999), to study properly the
impacts of a common monetary policy it is necessary to formulate a monetary
policy reaction function, which is uniform across countries and holds the
exchange rates fixed. Furthermore, Guiso et al emphasise that the statistical51
significance of the differences found between countries should be able to be tested
in order to judge the reliability and uncertainty of the results.
In addition to differences between countries, cross-sectional time-series data
can be problematic also with respect to the time dimension. In the case of EMU, it
is possible that the transition to a common monetary policy framework and
thereby the adoption of a new exchange rate mechanism and changes in the
regulatory environment have resulted in such a striking regime switch that it has
made the past evidence irrelevant. For example Guiso et al (1999) argue,
however, that although beliefs about policy may have changed with the outset of
the ESCB, it is unlikely that this institutional change has caused changes in
economic agents’ behaviour in a sharp or discontinuous fashion. Rather,
behaviour is likely to adjust gradually, thereby not leading to any significant
structural breaks in the data.
According to the ECB (1999), in the medium to long term EMU is likely to
reinforce trends, which were already prevailing in the EU banking systems before
the beginning of Stage Three. Due to increased competition within the euro area,
existing excess capacity is expected to be reduced further and the pressure for the
better profitability is assumed to still strengthen. Also internationalisation and
geographical diversification are expect to increase along with new
conglomerations, mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector. Moreover, for
example Dornbusch et al (1998a) claim that the introduction of the euro may
speed the rate at which financial relationships within Europe start to resemble
those in the United States. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable enough to expect the
past empirical evidence to retain some of its predicting value also for the near
future.
4.1 Macroeconometric models
The existing macroeconometric analysis of monetary transmission is commonly
divided into five categories on the basis of the models used: (1) large-scale single-
country and (2) multi-country models, (3) small-scale structural models,
(4) single-equation models and (5) structural vector autoregressions. Somewhat
contradictory results of representative studies of each type are summarised in
table 6 below for the four largest European countries, following the example of
Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998). Figures indicate the estimated impact of a 100
basis point increase in short-term interest rates on real GDP 4 to 8 quarters after
the initial monetary shock.52
Table 6. Estimated output responses (%) to a uniform
monetary shock in different types of models
Study DE FR IT UK Ranking
(1) BIS (1995)
1 –0.4 –0.4 –0.5 –0.9 DE=FR<IT<UK
(2) BIS (1995)
2 –0.7 –0.7 –0.3 –1.2 IT<DE=FR<UK
(3) Britton and Whitley (1997)
3 –0.5 –0.5 – –0.3 UK<DE=FR
(4) Dornbusch et al (1999b) –1.4 –1.5 –2.1 –0.9 UK<DE<FR<IT
(5) Ramaswamy and Sløk (1997) –0.6 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 FR<IT=UK<DE
(1) fixed ERM rates for Germany, France and Italy, and an endogenous exchange rate (ie
determined by the open interest-parity condition) for the United Kingdom
(2) endogenous exchange rates
(3) each country estimated separately
In what follows, these and few other studies most often quoted in the literature are
briefly discussed in the light of critique they have been given.
4.1.1 Large-scale single-country models
The BIS study (1995, 225–266) comprises a set of large-scale single-country
macroeconometric models simulated independently by the national central banks.
The simulations are conducted both under fixed exchange rates and allowing the
exchange rates to change either independently or assuming fixed intra-ERM
exchange rates against the rest of the world. The results for twelve industrialised
countries
20 indicate the simulated responses of real GDP to a common monetary
shock of a temporary one-percentage point increase in the monetary policy rate.
According to the results, in Europe at a two-year horizon, the output effects
are found to be by far the greatest in the United Kingdom (–0.89%) for an
endogenous exchange rate. Among the present euro area countries, the effects are
largest and approximately of the same size in Germany, France and Italy (–0.37,
–0.36 and –0.53%, respectively) under fixed ERM rates. Considerably smaller
effects are found in the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Spain (–0.18, –0.14,
–0.12 and –0.02%, respectively). On the basis of these results, the extent to which
the real economic activity is affected by monetary policy seems to be related to
the size of the economy, in the sense that effects are larger in larger economies.
One of the goals of the BIS study was to explore whether cross-country
differences in monetary policy effectiveness could be related to cross-country
differences in the underlying financial structures. However, in most cases
financial structure is only indirectly modelled, as it influences the modelling
mainly through decisions as to which interest rates and asset prices are included in
                                                
20 The BIS study includes the central bank models of the United States, Japan, Germany, France,
Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Austria and Switzerland.53
each country-specific model. Consequently, critique on these single-country
models focuses mainly on their lack of common structure. According to Kieler
and Saarenheimo (1998), variant assumptions under which the models have been
specified may at worst dominate any genuine differences in economic agents’
behaviour and in the underlying national economic and financial structures.
Moreover, as Guiso et al (1999) point out, estimating the models independently of
each other does not allow for formal statistical testing of differences found
between countries.
Another source of criticism is the size and structure of large-scale models as
such. Guiso et al (1999) argue that many of the equations within the models
would fail statistical tests assessing their specification. Furthermore, since
equations are estimated one at a time, the simultaneous nature of changes in a
wide range of macroeconomic variables is being ignored (Kieler and Saarenheimo
1998).
4.1.2 Large-scale multi-country models
The above-mentioned BIS study (1995, 582–603) reports results also from
simulating the rational-expectations version of the Federal Reserves Bank’s
Multi-Country Model for the G7 countries
21. Multi-country models impose a
similar structure across countries, which, on one hand, may reduce the potential
biases underlying the use of national models, but on the other hand, it can also
make the models less able to capture the specific features of individual economies
(Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998).
In the multi-country BIS study, the structure of the model is intended to be
used primarily to compare the channels of monetary transmission across
countries. Results for endogenous exchange rates indicate that output responses to
a temporary increase in the policy-controlled short-term interest rate of 100 basis
points, lasting for two years, are the largest in the United Kingdom (–1.20%) and
the second greatest in France and Germany (–0.70% and –0.65%, respectively),
whereas in Italy the reaction is found to be considerably smaller (–0.30%).
According to the results, almost all the effect on GDP is transmitted through the
cost-of-capital and exchange rate channels, whereas the cash flow and direct
consumption channels are found almost negligible.
                                                
21 The G7 countries include the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the
United Kingdom.54
4.1.3 Small-scale structural models
Small-scale structural models impose a common structure across countries
considered, but the criticism against them focuses primarily on their over-
simplified form and the high degree of aggregation hindering the capture of cross-
country differences in underlying economic structures. (Kieler and Saarenheimo
1998)
A small-scale structural model estimated by Britton and Whitley (1997)
applies the Mundell-Fleming model incorporating the Dornbusch overshooting
mechanism. The study finds that when the country-specific models are estimated
separately, output is less interest rate sensitive in the United Kingdom than in
Germany and France, but the difference is not large enough to be statistically
significant. On the other hand, when the models are estimated jointly, the
responses are found to be the same in all three countries.
On the basis of their own estimations and the prior empirical evidence, Britton
and Whitley conclude that some of the commonly cited differences between
countries are not really structural. And even when they are, Britton and Whitley
argue that they do not automatically imply that one economy is more sensitive
than another to a change in the stance of monetary policy.
4.1.4 Single-equation models
Compared to the models described above, studies based on single-equation
models are ideal in the sense that they allow both the exchange rate developments
and monetary policy shocks to be identical across countries. That is, the
specification of this form allows one to control for the intra-European exchange
rate channel, and thereby to simulate a common monetary shock under a fixed
exchange-rate framework, as it has been the case within EMU since the adoption
of the common currency. Furthermore, since estimations can be made jointly for a
set of countries, the statistical significance of differences found between countries
can be tested formally. On the other hand, in addition to the usual identification
problems, Guiso et al (1998) raise some doubts about the interpretability of the
results due to the ad-hoc nature of the equations.
Dornbusch et al (1998b) have estimated an equation for output growth for a
set of six European countries. Equations predict output growth in each country as
a function of past output growth in that country, past output growth in the other
countries, present and past values of expected and unexpected components of
interest rates, and present and past values of bilateral exchange rates against the
US dollar and the deutschemark (DM). Thereby, the method allows for
simultaneity in the determination of output across countries, but not for the
simultaneous determination of output, prices and monetary policy in each country.55
Findings on the effect after two years imply that the impact of monetary
policy on output is virtually the same in Germany (–1.40%), France (–1.54%) and
Spain (–1.54%) but considerably stronger in Italy (–2.14%) and Sweden
(–2.36%). The United Kingdom stands out with a notable smaller effect (–0.9%),
which is explained by smaller spill-over effects from other countries and by the
fact that the UK is more weakly related to the European economic cycle than the
other countries considered.
4.1.5 Structural vector autoregressions
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) aim at determining how a change in
one variable affects the others under consideration by relating a set of variables to
their lagged values. According to estimates based on a vector autoregression
model by Ramaswamy and Sløk (1998), the full effects of a contractionary
monetary shock on real activity in one group of EU countries (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) take roughly twice
as long to occur, but the resulting decline in output is almost twice as large as in
the other group (Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). Also
Ehrmann (1998) has used SVARs in modelling responses to monetary shocks in
thirteen European countries. According to his findings, reactions of
macroeconomic variables are weak on average but major heterogeneity exists in
their magnitude across countries, with effects being larger in larger economies.
According to Guiso et al (1999), models using SVARs run into problems of
asymmetric shocks and distinctive exchange rate changes. The former refers to a
situation where shocks to the models differ across countries either in terms of
their size or time path or both, making it difficult to draw comparisons between
countries. Furthermore, as Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) note, the black-box
nature of SVARs makes it difficult to relate the estimated parameters and impulse
responses to structural differences between economies. Moreover, since
assumptions about the way in which the monetary authorities react to new
developments in the economy tend to differ across models, different economic
responses could result even if the underlying structures of the economies were
similar.
The second problem in turn arises when the lock-in of the euro area currencies
is neglected in the model, since changing parities makes it difficult to distinguish
a given monetary policy shock from the other simultaneous shocks in the
economy, including the endogenous response to exchange rate movements.
Consequently, Guiso et al (1999) conclude that much of the evidence based on
SVARs is likely to be irrelevant in the common monetary policy framework.56
4.2 Microeconometric models
This section presents evidence from the prior microeconometric analysis on bank-
and firm-specific data. The importance of using micro level data is emphasised eg
by Guiso et al (1999), who state that it enables identifying behavioural differences
both between different groups of agents in the same country and between similar
groups of agents across different countries. The disaggregation of data may thus
reveal that observed aggregate differences in responses to common monetary
policy actions arise in fact for various different reasons. They can either result
from cross-country differences in household and corporate sector behaviour or
only from the fact that the mix of different types of households and firms differs
across countries.
In 1999, the ECB and the euro area national central banks established a group
of economists, called the Monetary Transmission Network (MTN), to work on the
euro area monetary transmission in a consistent and harmonious manner. The
Network is, in particular, aimed to examine empirically how monetary policy
decisions affect the national private sectors on a micro level. Working papers
written under this objective haven taken three different perspectives: (1) structural
and VAR macro models for the euro area and the national economies, (2) panel
micro data analyses of bank behaviour and (3) panel micro data analyses of
corporate investment behaviour. The two latter groups of studies are discussed in
greater detail below.
4.2.1 Models on bank-specific panel data
A total of ten studies, using national bank-specific cross-sectional time series data,
have been published in the ECB working paper series
22. Research on micro-level
bank data has contributed, in particular, to the study on the bank lending channel
of the euro area monetary transmission. The main focus has been on testing a
hypothesis that bank-specific characteristics affect the extent to which changes in
money market interest rates are transmitted into either credit expansion or
rationing by banks. Each country-specific paper contains also some descriptive
analysis of the structure of the national banking sector and the past
macroeconomic developments, which are considered to have a bearing in the
econometric analysis.
                                                
22 Evidence from bank level data is available for nine countries – Germany, Austria, the
Netherlands, Spain, Finland, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece – in the ECB Working Papers
No.’s 96–104, respectively. In addition, Paper No. 105 (Ehrmann et al) provides some evidence on
the aggregate euro area level and, in particular, compares the results for the four largest EMU
countries.57
The main results from the studies are collected in the following on the basis of
a brief summary by Angeloni et al (2002). According to estimations, loan supply
effects were found to be present in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands and Portugal, ie in these countries either smaller, less liquid or less
capitalised banks were found to adjust their loans more than their larger, more
liquid and better capitalised counterparts
23. In Austria, effects were found only
limited in the sense that supply shifts were observed only during recessions. In
Portugal in turn the effects seem to be totally absent, as no evidence of supply
shifts was found, even after an institutional reform that squeezed bank deposits
considerably.
For Finland the evidence is doubtful. According to Topi and Vilmunen
(2001), bank lending responses positively to changes in GDP growth and inflation
and negatively to contractionary monetary policy shocks, but the evidence in
favour of the bank lending channel is weak. As to the bank-specific variables,
both the linear effects and those through interaction with the policy rate are signed
as expected, but the statistical significance of the interaction terms is poor.
Consequently, the writers tentatively conclude that the bank heterogeneity is not
irrelevant for the way in which changes in interest rates affect lending, but that the
data used is too noisy for any definite signals to be identified.
According to Ehrmann et al (2001), an aggregate level cross-country
comparison can be drawn by estimating the model country by country using bank-
specific micro level data and then by weighting the banks in the sample with their
respective market shares when calculating the overall loan responses of banks in a
given country. Ehrmann et al have performed such an analysis for four countries,
the results implying that the magnitude of lending reactions is similar in France
and Spain, and similar in Germany and Italy but much weaker than in France and
Spain.
All in all, based on their own estimations and the above-described country-
specific papers, Ehrmann et al (2001) conclude that monetary policy has a
significant effect on bank lending both on the country and aggregate euro area
level. In general, Ehrmann et al find that less liquid banks tend to react more
strongly to monetary policy actions than more liquid banks do, whereas size and
the degree of capitalisation of the bank are not that relevant for the way in which
it adjusts its lending to interest rate changes. Moreover, on the basis of descriptive
cross-country comparisons between euro area banking systems, Ehrmann et al
state that the way in which banks respond to monetary policy actions can be
explained partly by the structure of the national banking system.
                                                
23 In the estimated models, size is measured as a log of total bank assets, whereas liquidity and
capitalisation are given, respectively, by the ratio of liquid assets and the sum of capital and
reserves to total bank assets.58
4.2.2 Models on firm-specific panel data
Within the MTN, the transmission of monetary policy has been investigated also
using micro-level data on firms
24, with the main purpose in analysing the
existence of the credit channel. More specifically, papers generated under this
objective aim at testing whether firms’ investment is sensitive to the user cost of
capital and further at examining to what extent the costs are affected by monetary
policy actions. In addition, also sales and cash flow are used in explaining
investment dynamics. Furthermore, a distinction between small and large firms is
made in order to explore whether significant differences exist between them in
terms of their investment behaviour.
Results for Germany, France, Italy and Spain imply an operative interest rate
channel in all four countries, as investments are found to be sensitive to policy-
induced changes in the user cost of capital. Moreover, investment is found to be
quite sensitive also to movements in sales and cash flow, but only in Italy
reactions are found to differ across firms depending on their size. Consequently,
the paper concludes that the firm size may not be the right indicator in all
countries to investigate the functioning of the broad credit channel. (Chatelain et
al 2001)
On the Finnish financial statement data, the firm-level estimates do not
provide any evidence for the existence of binding financing constraints in firms’
investment spending, but both the sales accelerator and user-cost effects are found
to be significant. However, according to Vilmunen (2002), the effects are
surprisingly weak, for which a plausible explanation might the sample being
biased to large firms. In fact, findings on the aggregate-level data suggest much
stronger responses.
                                                
24 Evidence on investment dynamics is available for France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Italy and
Luxembourg in ECB Working Papers No.’s 106–111. In addition, Paper No. 112 is conducted for
the four largest EMU countries. Results for Finland have been published as a BoF discussion
paper.59
5 Descriptive statistics on financial systems
Financial structure is commonly considered important to monetary transmission
and, in fact, a major determinant of the monetary transmission mechanisms. It
affects the process, in particular, by influencing the speed at which monetary
policy actions affect the market interest rates
25 and the extent to which the interest
rate changes are transmitted into the real economy. Hoogduin and Huisman
(1998) divide the mechanisms through which interest rate changes affect the real
economic activity into four complementary channels: through short- and long-
term market interest rates on new financing, through adjustable interest rates on
outstanding loans, through the implied revaluation of assets and through
exchange rate changes. Thus, the overall interest rate sensitivity of banks, firms
and households depends on the level and composition of their wealth and
indebtedness, as well as on many other structural characteristics of the respective
financial system.
This section presents descriptive statistics for a set of European countries on
factors commonly considered relevant to the monetary transmission process, and
specifically, to the operation of the bank lending channel. The main purpose here
is to explore significant structural differences between financial systems across
the present and potential future Member States and to shed some light to the
microeconomic heterogeneity between countries. However, since the comparison
of countries rests mainly on a simple description of data, the statistical
deficiencies and discrepancies of which cannot be fully discovered, conclusions
should be considered somewhat tentative.
Recently, similar comparative analyses for different sets of countries have
been drawn for example by Favero and Giavazzi (1999) and Fase and de Bondt
(2000).
26 Favero and Giavazzi address the issue of asymmetries in monetary
transmission by discussing theoretical transmission mechanisms in respect to the
relevant institutional and empirical evidence for the United States and a set
European countries. Fase and de Bondt in turn provide an extensive survey of
theories of credit to the private sector and present relevant stylized facts for six
EU countries. The view of the prior studies is broadened here by taking additional
countries and indicators into consideration. Moreover, Finland is of key interest,
since so far it has commonly been neglected in EMU-wide cross-country
comparisons.
To begin with, the securities markets are compared across countries. After
discussing the importance of direct finance, financial intermediaries are brought
                                                
25 See, for example, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) for empirical evidence for a strong relation
between the degree of interest rate stickiness and the structure of the financial system.
26 See also Peersman (2001), Cecchetti (1999), de Bondt (1998) and BIS (1995), among others.60
into focus. The size and structure of financial intermediary markets are examined
across countries and differences in various banking sector characteristics are
considered in greater detail. The two opposite roles of financial intermediaries as
creditors and debtors are discussed by comparing the two most important banking
customer sectors, households and nonfinancial corporations, across countries. The
focus is on examining how their financial assets and liabilities differ from one
country to another in terms of their structure and amount relative to GDP.
5.1 Securities market
The securities markets comprise markets for direct finance, which on the basis of
maturity of instruments can be divided into money and capital markets, with the
latter divided further into stock and bond markets. In Europe, bank loans have
historically had a more prominent role in corporate finance than equity and bonds,
but there are, however, considerable differences in overall bank dependence
across countries.
The degree of bank dependence is an important factor determining the
strength and effectiveness of the bank lending channel. Basically, the larger the
securities market in the economy, the less heavily the nonfinancial corporate
sector should depend on intermediated finance. Moreover, since large firms have
a better access to capital markets, countries with many small firms should react
more strongly to monetary policy shocks than countries where firms are larger on
average.
Table 7 below illustrates the relative importance of national direct and indirect
credit markets across the EU countries. The first column shows the value of
domestic companies’ shares as a % of GDP at the year-end 2000. Since shares are
valued at prevailing market prices, the total market capitalisation responds to
changes in both number and value of shares. Thereby, since rises in share prices in
the secondary market do not lead to any additional flows of finance to the listed
companies, the capitalisation figures exaggerate the importance of actual equity
finance especially during the boom in the late 1990s. Thereby, the amount of new
capital raised by domestic companies relative to a country’s gross fixed capital
formation, shown in the second column of the table, reflects more realistically the
use of direct finance.61
Table 7. Direct vs indirect credit markets












AT 16 5 105 0.18
BE 81 – 81 0.29
FI 242 48 54 1.05
FR 112 – 89 2.32
DE 68 6 123 1.08
GR 96 36 54 1.02
IE 86 24 109 0.38
IT 72 5 78 1.13
LU 179 49 111 1.91
NL 174 – 143 2.51
PT 58 50 144 1.52
ES 90 – 104 1.32
DK 69 18 35 0.54
SE 144 29 45 2.20
UK 184 14 132 2.58
(a) in 2000
(b) corporate bond emissions; average for the years 1998–2001, or for those available
Source: FIBV, calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics,
Eurostat, Sampo Oyj and Dealogic Bondware.
The first measure indicates that at the year-end 2000 stock markets were
particularly large – the value exceeding the GDP for the year – in Finland, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, in
most countries stock indices reached their peaks during the year 2000 and were
exceptionally high still at the end of December. Since the high around the turn of
the century, the stock market values have, however, declined considerably in
many of the euro area countries, for example in Finland as low as near to the late-
1998 level
27. Consequently, a comparison between countries is more relevant here
than the past values as such. The second measure implies that also in Portugal
equity finance was increasing in importance, whereas in Austria, Germany and
Italy new capital issues were rather minor at the time.
The third column shows the value of outstanding credits by domestic financial
intermediaries to the private sector in the country as a % of GDP. The indicator
measures the relative size of the financial intermediary sector from the assets’
point of view and it is often interpreted as indicating the level of financial services
and the financial intermediary development. Economies are often categorised as
                                                
27 The Finnish stock market was very small until the late 1990s, but since then the number of both
investors and listed companies has increased considerably.62
being either bank- or market-based, for example Austria, Germany and Italy
falling into the former and the United Kingdom to the latter group of countries
28.
The last column shows the value of corporate bond emissions relative to GDP.
The use of bonds has increased rather steadily through the late 1990s but their role
is still small compared to the other forms of finance. Consequently, differences
between countries are also less striking. For example, in Finland the growth of
bond markets, beginning in the early 1990s, was mainly due to the increased
government borrowing, but as a source of corporate finance bonds are still of a
minor importance.
According to de Bondt (1998), the loan-deposit spread, ie the difference
between the lending rate charged by the financial intermediaries and the deposit
rate paid, can be used as a rough proxy for direct credit market imperfections.
Basically, an increase in transaction costs and informational asymmetries
increases also the spread. Moreover, the spread is typically lower for nonfinancial
corporations than for households, implying that, in general, transaction costs and
informational asymmetries form less a problem for firms than for households. In
the de Bondt study, the corporate sector spread was found to be the lowest in the
United Kingdom and Netherlands (as compared to Germany, France, Italy and
Belgium), where stock markets were at the time the largest relative to GDP.
5.2 Financial Intermediaries
Since financial intermediaries play an important role in the credit view of
monetary transmission, cross-country differences between financial intermediary
sectors may give rise to considerable asymmetries across EMU. This section starts
by viewing recent developments in financial intermediary markets and then
compares the size and structure of the present national financial sectors, with the
main focus on the euro area banking systems.
Financial intermediaries can be divided into deposit banks and non-bank
financial institutions, with the latter comprising typically insurance institutions,
credit card and finance companies, mortgage banks and special credit institutions.
(The Finnish Bankers’ Association 2001) The growing importance of non-bank
financial intermediaries relative to banks seems to be a common structural change,
taking place in most of the developed countries
29. In many countries depository
institutions have had for many years a falling share of total financial intermediary
                                                
28 For further discussion, see eg Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1999).
29 See, for example, Allen and Santomero (2001) for a more detailed description of recent
developments in the US financial intermediary market, which is a pioneer in this development.
Compared to the United States, many countries are still in their very early stages.63
assets, whereas financial assets held indirectly in the form of pension and mutual
funds have continuously increased in importance.
Nevertheless, when comparing their assets to GDP, banking sectors have in
general managed to maintain their position by innovating and switching from the
traditional banking business to fee-producing activities, such as trusts, annuities,
mutual funds, mortgage banking, insurance brokerage and transaction services.
Consequently, to an increasing degree deposit banks belong to business groups,
which offer a broad range of financial services, typically insurance policies,
investment services, capital financing and transfer of payments. The traditional
banking business of accepting deposits and admitting loans is thus in transition.
Schmidt et al (1999) have explored the role of banks as compared to securities
markets. Based on data comprising France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
they did not find any general trend towards disintermediation with the banking
sector losing importance to the capital markets. Likewise, Allen and Santomero
(2001) see the new markets for futures and options mainly as markets for
intermediaries rather than for individuals or firms. Instead, according to Schmidt
et al there seems to be another common pattern of change as deposit banks are
specialising more in lending operations and non-bank financial intermediaries are
taking over a more important role in mobilising capital from the savers.
In Europe, the national financial sectors differ quite tremendously in terms of
their size relative to the respective total economy. To draw a comparison between
a set of EU countries, figures 9 and 10 below present the financial sector financial
assets and liabilities by balance sheet items as a % of GDP in 2000
30.
                                                
30 The data is derived from the Eurostat Financial Accounts and the classification of the financial
balance sheet items corresponds to the standards of the 1995 European System of Accounts (ESA
1995). In this context, the financial sector comprises all corporations principally engaged in
financial intermediation and/or in auxiliary financial activities. Due to ignoring the balancing item
‘net financial assets’, assets and liabilities do not equal in the figures. To calculate the ratios
depicted in figures 9, 10 and 12–15, nominal end-of year assets and liabilities for the years 1999
and 2000 are deflated by the end-of-year consumer price indices for the respective years, and then
the average of the two is divided by the real GDP for the latter year.64



















Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
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As shown in figure 9 above, in most of the countries considered, outstanding
loans make up the largest individual item among the financial sector financial
assets, but there is, however, great variance between countries when comparing
the amount of loans to GDP or to the other financial assets. Based on data in 2000,
the share of loans in total financial assets varies from 27% in the United Kingdom
to 44% in Portugal, whereas relative to GDP the most loans are in the Netherlands
and the least in Finland, with the shares of 219% and 69% respectively. In Finland
loans account for 41% of the total financial sector financial assets, so despite their
small amount in terms of the total economy they constitute a considerable share of
the assets.
The proportion of securities in financial sector financial assets is also
considerable in all sample countries. Shares and securities other than shares
account together for 32% to 50% of the total financial assets, Portugal having the
least and France and Sweden the most security-intensive financial sector. Other
accounts receivable – comprising here monetary gold and special drawing rights,
insurance technical reserves and trade credits and advances – are rather
insignificant in most of the countries considered.65





















Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
%
As shown in figure 10 above, currency and deposits account for a major share of
the total financial sector liabilities in all sample countries, varying from a high of
60% in Portugal to a low of 30% in the Netherlands and Denmark in 2000. In
Finland currency and deposits account for 40% of the total liabilities but are with
64% the least as compared to GDP across countries. In contrast, in the United
Kingdom and Belgium, currency and deposits amount to over twice the GDP. The
high proportion of insurance technical reserves
31 in the United Kingdom and
Netherlands reflects their large pension funds and insurance companies (see also
figure 11 below).
Interestingly, financial sectors differ greatly also when the value of loans on
the asset side of their balance sheets is compared to the amount of currency and
deposits on the liability side, see table 8. In the Netherlands, Italy and the Nordic
countries, the value of loans exceeds that of deposits, whereas in Belgium and
France deposits are nearly twice as high as the loans granted.
Table 8. Loans outstanding as a % of currency and deposits
in the financial sector financial balance sheets
at the year-end 2000
AU BE FI FR DE IT NL PT ES DK SE UK
76 51 108 53 81 102 130 76 63 134 115 61
Source: calculations based on the Eurostat’s Financial Accounts.
                                                
31 Insurance technical reserves comprise provisions established by insurance corporations and
pension funds for prepayments of insurance premiums and reserves for outstanding claims; see
ESA 1995 for a more detailed definition.66
The small amount of shares and other securities, as compared to deposits, in the
financial sector liabilities coincides with the fact that financial intermediaries do
not tend to raise funds by issuing shares or bonds.
The United Kingdom and Netherlands stand out with very large financial
sectors in terms of their financial assets and liabilities relative to GDP. Financial
sectors in France, Germany, Denmark and Belgium are considerably smaller than
in the United Kingdom and Netherlands, but nevertheless larger than in Sweden,
Spain and Italy. By these measures, Finland has, somewhat surprisingly, clearly
the smallest financial intermediary sector among the countries considered.
Consequently, the commonly held view of Finland being a particularly bank-
based economy holds only when comparing banks to non-bank financial
intermediaries – not relative to the size of the total economy. Moreover, the same
holds also historically, as is evidenced by the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics time series (see eg figure A9 in appendix 2), so the current situation is
not due to any recent courses of development. The gradual deregulation of the
Finnish financial markets in the late 1980s together with the economic depression
and the subsequent banking crisis in the early 1990s resulted in a peak in the ratio
of credit to GDP, but besides these rather exceptional years the relative size of the
financial sector has evolved rather steadily.
There are significant differences also in the institutional structures of the
national financial sectors. In the Netherlands and United Kingdom insurance
corporations and pensions funds account for a considerable share of financial
sector total financial assets, as was already suggested by the large amount
insurance technical reserves. Monetary financial institutions, other than the central
bank,
32 are however dominant in all sample countries, accounting for more than
half of the sector’s total financial assets.
                                                
32 Other monetary financial institutions (other MFIs) are defined in ESA 1995 as comprising
(a) commercial banks, ‘universal’ banks, ‘all-purpose’ banks (b) savings banks (c) post office giro
institutions, post banks, giro banks (d) rural credit banks, agricultural credit banks, co-operative
credit banks, credit unions, and (f) specialised banks.67
Figure 11. Distribution of financial sector financial assets




















Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
To further compare the size of the EU financial sector, table 9 below shows the
credit institutions’ balance sheet totals and loans to customers as a % of GDP,
calculated on the basis of Eurostat’s Special Feature on Banking (2001). Also the
share of loans in the balance sheet total is depicted in order to assess the
importance of lending activities from the banks’ point of view. The table is in line
with figures 9 and 10, and further emphasises the role of loans in Germany and
the Netherlands, and outside EMU, in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The
Finnish credit institutions are among the smallest lenders relative to GDP, but
when compared to the sector’s balance sheet total, the ratio is the second highest.68

























AU 262 128 49 870 108 39
BE 313 110 35 89 9 66
FI 106 75 71 361 70 56
FR 212 70 33 1148 19 48
DE 328 161 49 3055 37 14
GR 114 45 39 41 4 77
IE 189 94 50 53 15 47
IT 155 76 49 876 15 26
LU 3325 651 20 210 489 29
NL 242 140 58 169 11 81
PT 283 115 41 219 22 75
ES 179 94 53 387 10 42
DK 233 146 63 201 38 75
SE 174 109 63 212 24 88
UK 313 259 83 492 8 26
(a) in 1999 except in 1998 for Finland and in 1997 for Ireland
(b) loans of the five biggest credit institution as a % of total in 1997
Source: ECB (1999) and Eurostat (2001).
According to prior econometric evidence, lending is more closely tied to monetary
policy shocks in small banks than in large banking conglomerates (see eg
Kashyap and Stein 2000). Larger banks are less sensitive to changes in reserves,
since they have better access to non-deposit sources of finance and more and
better information with respect to capital markets (Fase and de Bondt 2000).
Thereby, in countries where the banking system consists of small rather large
banks, bank lending is expected to react more strongly to interest rate changes.
As shown in table 10 below, most banks are small in Austria, Finland,
Portugal, Denmark and Sweden, whereas in Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and
the United Kingdom the share of large banks is considerable. The four largest
euro area countries fall in the middle with mostly medium-sized banks. In general,
the recent trend has been towards larger conglomerates through mergers within
the banking sector and between banks and insurance companies. Austria and
Finland have also considerably more banks per capita than the other EU countries,
which for Finland is explained by the large amount of small co-operative banks.
Greece, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands have the least
banks per capita, while the rest fall in between.
One additional way of measuring the structure of the banking system is to
look at the share of the five largest creditors in total bank loans. Countries with
the most banks per capita are typically among the ones with the least concentrated69
systems. Interestingly, geographically small countries tend towards a high
concentration of the banking industry and vice versa, which according to de Bondt
(1998) suggests that banks may need a particular minimum size in order to benefit
from the economies of scale.
Table 10. Size and health of credit institutions
Breakdown (%) by size classes in terms of the balance sheet
total (Mio. euro)
a




AU 62.2 32.5 4.4 0.9 0.36
BE 16.9 43.8 31.5 7.8 0.40
FI 80.6 16.3 2.5 0.6 1.07
FR 33.6 39.8 23.2 3.4 0.48
DE 29.0 53.0 15.7 2.3 0.50
GR 34.1 26.8 29.3 9.8 1.77
IE – – – – 1.00
IT 37.0 42.1 16.6 4.3 0.45
LU 13.8 45.7 33.3 7.1 0.50
NL – – – – 0.81
PT 69.4 15.5 11.9 3.2 0.47
ES 34.6 34.1 26.6 4.7 0.60
DK 60.7 29.4 5.0 5.0 0.59
SE 51.4 32.5 10.8 5.2 0.73
UK 12.8 36.2 34.6 16.4 1.10
(a) in 1999 except in 1998 for Finland, in 1997 for Ireland, Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom, and in 1996 for Germany
Source: ECB (1999) and Eurostat (2001).
A common argument is also that large, healthy banks are less sensitive to
monetary policy, since they can offset reserve contractions more readily with
other forms of finance, on which reserves are not required. Table ttt reports the
rate of return on assets as a measure of the banking sector profitability.
5.3 Households
In most countries, households are the most important banking customer sector.
Their dependence on bank loans is high due to very limited access to other forms
of finance
33. On the other hand, households are also an important source of
finance as they save primarily by depositing money in banks. The financial assets
                                                
33 For example in Finland, the domestic deposit banks have granted nearly 90% of the household
sector's outstanding credit stock, whereas at least in Sweden and Denmark also mortgage banks
have an important role, in particular, in financing housing loans.70
and liabilities of twelve EU household sectors are compared below on the basis of
Eurostat Financial Accounts
34. Findings rely partly on Elomaa’s (2001) 11-
country comparison with the similar but prior data. Nevertheless, before drawing
the cross-country comparison, the Allen and Santomero (henceforth AS) study
(2001) is briefly discussed in order to relate the household behaviour to certain
specific banking sector activities.
In the AS study, cross-country differences in portfolio allocations of
household financial assets are used for assessing the role of banks in risk
management. AS classify equity and real estate as risky assets, the proportion of
which of total household financial assets indicates the relative amount of risk
borne by the respective household sector. Furthermore, in countries where the
amount of risky assets held by households is high not only relative to their total
financial assets but also to GDP, the absolute amount of risk is high as well.
Based on these findings and statistics for a set of five countries, AS state that the
US and UK households are exposed to a substantially greater amount of risk than
their counterparts in Japan, France and Germany, both in terms of total household
financial assets and relative to GDP.
AS explain these differences by the Allen and Gale theory of efficient risk
sharing
35. The theory states that in market-based financial systems, such as those
in the United States and United Kingdom, competition from financial markets
weakens the intertemporal smoothing of risks, since in economically good times
households tend to transfer their investments from banks to money and capital
markets. By buying assets that allow the immediate consumption of current
payoffs, they aim at avoiding the otherwise apparent unprofitable accumulation of
reserves.
36 As a result, cross-sectional risk sharing becomes correspondingly more
important, meaning that risks are exchanged between more and less risk-averse
individuals at any given point in time. Consequently, banks have to manage risk
by using derivatives and other similar techniques instead of adjusting reserves. On
                                                
34 Due to a lack of disaggregation in the available data, figures for households include also non-
profit institutions, which serve households by providing non-market goods and services. Their
principal resources, apart from those derived from occasional sales, are derived from voluntary
household contributions, from payments made by the government and from property income (ESA
1995). Moreover, it should be noted that a lot of wealth is ignored in the financial accounts data, as
for example car stock, pay as you go -pensions and a part of real estates are totally left out. This,
of course, distorts the comparison between countries the more, the higher the share of these assets
is in total household wealth.
35 See Allen and Gale (1997, 2000) for details.
36 The US and UK households not only hold much higher proportions in risky assets but also own
more financial assets per capita. For this reason, Elomaa (2001) sees the differences in proportions
of risky assets primarily as a proof of marginal risk aversion being a decreasing function of wealth.
This is not the whole picture though, since part of the real wealth is being ignored in the context of
the mere financial assets, as was discussed above.71
the other hand, in bank-based systems, as in Japan, France and Germany, risks can
still be managed over time in connection with the traditional banking business by
investing in securities of varied maturities.
Figure 12 below presents the household financial assets relative to GDP
across countries in 2000. Variation across countries is considerable, concerning
both the amount and composition of the assets. Some underlying factors,
discussed in Elomaa (2001), are also briefly presented here as tentative
explanations for the main differences between countries.




















Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
%
Households in the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands have the
highest financial assets when compared to GDP, amounting to approximately
twice the ratios in Finland, Denmark and Austria. The value of currency and
deposits relative to GDP is the highest in Portugal and Austria and the lowest in
the three Nordic countries in the sample. Moreover, in Portugal currency and
deposits account for almost a half of the total household financial assets and in
Austria as much as 56%, indicating that in both countries bank deposits provide
the main form of saving.
In the United Kingdom and Netherlands, the value of insurance technical
reserves, comprising net equity of households in life insurance and pension funds,
is exceptionally high, reflecting the fact that the Dutch and the British save
through pension funds and insurance companies, rather than through banks
(Hoogduin and Huisman 1998). The insurance technical reserves are, however,
the most variant item across countries and the differences between country-
specific social security systems make the valid cross-country comparison
somewhat difficult.72
Shares and other equity comprise both quoted and unquoted shares, with the
latter referring to shares of non-listed companies including the housing stock
37. In
Finland the proportion of unquoted shares in total household-owned shares is
considerably larger than that of quoted, and the same holds also for at least
France, Spain and Belgium (for whom the disaggregation is available in the
underlying data at the year-end 2000). In particular, in Finland approximately
two-thirds of the housing stock consists of owner-occupied homes, half of which
is in the form of housing companies (Elomaa 2001), whose shares are treated as
personal financial property
38. Also here the comparability of the data is, however,
somewhat questionable across countries so, if available, the use of more
disaggregated data would be necessary to clarify the picture further.
As shown in figure 13 below, relative to GDP also the value of household
liabilities differs quite significantly across countries. According to the data, the
Finnish and Italian households are the least indebted in the sample, whereas the
Danish and Dutch are the ones with the most debt as compared to GDP. Accounts
payable other than loans play a minor role in all sample countries. Elomaa (2001)
sees the differences in household indebtedness as resulting primarily from
differences in housing loan and mortgage maturities. In Finland the loan
maturities are relatively short, which is reflected as a low level of debt.
Nevertheless, data separating loans on the basis of their uses would make the
cross-country comparison more relevant.












Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
%
                                                
37 Unquoted shares are valued at nominal values, except for the housing stock, which is valued at
(approximated) market values.
38 Housing shares give their owner the right of physical control and occupancy of a specific
apartment, whereas the building and real estate remain the property of the housing company. The
housing shares can be sold or used as collateral for a loan, as any other financial property.73
As to the potency of monetary policy, an increase in an official central bank rate
tends to affect economic activity more strongly in countries, where households are
more heavily indebted and hold a larger part of their wealth in the form of assets,
such as equity and real estate, whose price is highly interest rate sensitive.
Consequently, countries with highly indebted household sectors are more likely to
face depressed consumption in the aftermath of interest rate increases. On the
contrary, in countries, where households have high net assets and large amount of
variable-rate claims, changes in interest rates may in part be offset by a fiscal
impact on household disposable income. (Hoogduin and Huisman 1998)
Moreover, also the proportion of adjustable rate credit and mortgages as well
as the share of loans backed by real estate collateral should affect the potency of
monetary policy through household sector behaviour. Basically, in countries,
where the majority of loans is backed by collateral, a change in interest rates
should have a stronger effect on real economic activity due to changes in
collateral values. (Favero and Giavazzi 1999)
Table 11 below depicts the household liabilities as % of financial assets at the
year-end 2000. Figures indicate that Belgian, French and Finnish households are
considerable more indebted relative to their financial assets than for example
German and Danish households.
Table 11. Household liabilities as % of financial assets
at the year-end 2000
AU BE FI FR DE IT NL PT ES DK SE UK
70 86 78 80 59 87 71 61 69 33 67 74
Source: Calculations based on the Eurostat’s Financial Accounts.
5.4 Nonfinancial corporations
Nonfinancial corporations have a wider range of sources of finance at their
disposal than the household sector. Thereby, the proportion of bank loans in total
corporate sector finance may vary over time, whereas in the case of households
the role of bank loans is more pronounced. Furthermore, retained earnings are
often the most important source of finance for firms, but it is more difficult to
compile statistics on them than on intermediated and direct finance.
As shown in figure 14 below, corporate sector financial assets consist mainly
of shares and other equity. There are, however, considerable differences across
countries both in terms of the amount and structure of the assets, but their
relevance and reasons for them are not that easily detected without more
disaggregated data.74


















Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
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Figure 15. Nonfinancial corporate sector liabilities















Source: calculations based on Eurostat Financial Accounts.
%
According to figure 15 above, in proportion to GDP the Finnish and French
nonfinancial corporate sectors have the largest liabilities in the sample. Again, it
should be noted, however, that share prices rose vigorously during the late 1990s,
thus explaining the high proportion of shares and other equity in the total75
liabilities
39. In terms of the value of outstanding loans, Finland is placed slightly
below the average. The proportion of securities other than shares is strikingly low
in all sample countries, reflecting the minor development of markets for corporate
bonds in Europe.
Comparing loans to shares and other equity in the liability side of the balance
sheets (table 12) reveals that there are considerable cross-country differences
between nonfinancial corporate sectors with respect to their leverage ratios.
Austrian firms are financed mainly by loans, whereas in other countries equity
dominates clearly. However, despite the high value of equities booked in the
balance sheets, on a net basis shares account for a minor share of flows of external
corporate finance in most countries.
Table 12. Loans as a % of shares and other equity in the
nonfinancial corporate sector liabilities
at the year-end 2000
AU BE FI FR DE IT NL PT ES DK SE UK
337 33 25 20 77 58 61 79 39 69 58 32
Source: Calculations based on the Eurostat Financial Accounts.
Guiso et al (1999) use the share of firms with only one banking relationship as an
indicator for the strength of the bank lending channel. Table 13 below reports the
figures for the EU countries, indicating that approximately a fourth of firms has
only one bank relationship in Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United
Kingdom, whereas in France, Italy and Portugal the majority of firms has at least
as many as seven.
Table 13. % of firms with n bank relationships
n A UB E F IF RD E G R I E I TL UN LP TE S D KS E U K
1 1 9014 1 60 2 43 2 9 1 552 1 0 2 3 2 3
2 1 4 2 5 2 9488 3 530 2 537 2 7 3 3 2 8
3 – 7 4 42 56 73 34 05 13 22 35 75 83 14 46 14 44 6
> 7 2 2 5 02 5 8 3 7 4 1 1 0 7 0 1 42 6 2 4 7204
Source: Ongena and Smith (2000).
                                                
39 At the year-end 1999, among the countries considered, the stock market capitalisation was the
highest in Finland relative to GDP. Since then, share prices have generally fallen significantly, so
the data for the years 1999 and 2000 is rather exceptional for most of the countries considered.
Moreover, in Finland a few large companies, such as the telecommunications and forest
companies, affect greatly the nonfinancial corporate sector data, making it sensitive to fluctuations
in certain lines of business. For annual flows of external corporate finance in Finland, see Bank of
Finland (2002b).76
6 Econometric analysis of the role of the financial
system in the bank lending channel
Financial intermediation, and bank lending in particular, has clearly an important
role in the economy. On one hand, changes in loan demand influence returns and
profitability of the banking industry and, on the other, shifts in loan supply affect
the general economic growth through private consumption and investment. This
section performs a twelve-country panel data analysis with the purpose of
investigating whether the impact of monetary policy on bank lending depends on
country-specific financial system characteristics. Thus, in contrast to prior
microeconomic studies on bank-specific data, here the aim is at comparing
countries and at examining the role of the national financial system in the
monetary transmission process.
6.1 Model specification
The model relies heavily on Ehrmann et al (2001), which in turn has its origins in
a simple version of the Bernanke-Blinder (1988) model presented in section
3.4.1
40. In what follows, the Ehrmann et al model is modified from a micro to a
macro perspective by focusing on aggregate bank loan markets instead of
individual banks. Consequently, the model used here incorporates national
financial (or banking) system characteristics in place of micro-level bank
variables. Therefore, the analysis basically answers to a question, whether the
effects found on a micro level cancel each other out when each country is
considered as an aggregate. If not, responses to monetary policy actions are likely
to be asymmetric across countries.
According to the model, in the money market equilibrium in a country i in
quarter t money mit equals deposits dit, which depend on the monetary policy
interest rate rit according to a relationship
      it it it r d m , (6.1)
where parameters  and  are assumed to be positive and, more importantly,
equal across countries, implying that the effect on deposits (or money) of a one
unit change in the interest rate is of the same size in all countries. A central bank
is thus considered to have a direct control over the amount of deposits available to
                                                
40 Also Kashyap and Stein (1994, 2000) have performed a similar analysis on the US bank-level
data, with the main focus on the effect of size and liquidity of banks.77
banks. Basically, the higher the national monetary policy interest rate, the less
liquid the money markets should be in that country.
In the bank loan markets, demand for loans 
d
it l  faced by the banking sector in
a country i at time t is assumed to depend positively on real GDP yit and the price
level pit and negatively on the interest rate on loans iit:
it 3 it 2 it 1
d
it i p y l       . (6.2)
Again the parameters (1, 2 and 3) are assumed to be the same across countries,
ie the demand for loans is considered to be independent of any national financial
system characteristics. The assumption of homogenous reaction of loan demand to
interest rate changes is important for the identification of loan supply effects of
monetary policy actions.
41
The supply of loans 
s
it l  by the banking sector in a country i at time t is
assumed to depend positively on the amount of deposits available and the interest
rate on loans and negatively on the monetary policy interest rate according to a
relationship
it 5 it 4 it it
s
it r i d l       , (6.3)
where it, 4 and 5 > 0. Thus, the higher is the monetary policy interest rate, the
lower the supply of bank loans should be. This direct effect of monetary policy on
loan supply is based on opportunity costs for banks. Costs arise when banks are
forced to use the interbank market to finance their loans, or when the mark-up
pricing by banks passes on increases in deposit rates further to interest rates on
loans.
The indirect impact of monetary policy on bank lending operates through
changes in the amount of deposits available for banks. Banking sectors in
different countries are modelled to be unequally dependent on deposits, with the
effect varying over time depending on a national financial system characteristic xit
as follows:
it 1 0 it x      , (6.4)
where 0 > 0, while the sign of 1 depends on the direction of the influence of the
variable xit. If a higher value of the variable makes the banking sector less
dependent on deposits, then 1 > 0, and vice versa. Thus, with positive 1, the
                                                
41 Asymmetric responses of bank lending to GDP and prices are allowed if, as in equation (6.11),
the interaction terms of these variables with the national financial system characteristics are
included in the model.78
higher the value of xit (ceteris paribus), the less a decrease in deposits should
decrease the supply of loans. The model thus allows for asymmetric supply shifts
across countries to an equal monetary-policy-induced change in deposits.
The loan market equilibrium occurs when the demand for and supply of bank
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(6.5)
By solving the pair of equations for the equilibrium lending lit by eliminating the
lending rate iit, the equations can be combined into a reduced-form model of the
bank loan market:
.
r d p y
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which can be simplified further into the form
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The coefficient 4 relates the reaction of bank lending to a monetary policy
indicator rit to the national financial system characteristic xit. It thus reflects the
heterogeneity of loan supply responses across countries, with a significant
positive (negative) coefficient implying that the impact of monetary policy on79
bank lending decreases (increases) if the value of the country-specific
characteristic increases.
The relationship of loans to real GDP and the price level can also be thought
of as being loglinear. Consequently, the model can be rewritten as
     it 5 it it 4 it 3 it 2 it 1 it x x r r CPI ln GDP ln L ln             , (6.9)
where lit = ln(Lit), yit = ln(GDPit) and pit = ln(CPIit), and the respective coefficients
1 and 2 can now be interpreted as elasticities.
Rewriting equation (6.9) further in first differences introduces an difference
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L L  
 , the first difference of the natural logarithm of
the dependent variable approximates the quarterly growth rate of bank loans to the
nonfinancial private sector in country i in quarter t. The model is then of the form
     , x r x r r CPI ln GDP ln L ln it it 5 it it 4 it 3 it 2 it 1 it               (6.10)
where variable xit has been left unchanged, since depending on the case, it can be
of any chosen form in the final model. In what follows, equation (6.10) is
extended by adding two other financial system characteristics yit and zit in the
model.
A dynamic version of the model includes also lagged dependent variables as
explanatory variables, and furthermore, by adding lags to other variables as well,
long-run dynamics of the model can be examined. Consequently, the model
estimated in the Ehrmann et al study regresses the growth rate of loans on lagged
loan growth, quarterly GDP growth, quarterly inflation rate, quarterly interest rate
change and three unit-specific characteristics (denoted here by xit–1, yit–1 and zit–1)
and their interactions terms: (equation 6.11)80
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i = 1,…,N, t = 1,…,T and j = 0,…,s denote countries, time periods (quarters) and
the number of lags, respectively. Alternatively, all explanatory variables could be
lagged, ie j  =  1,…,s, in order to avoid the potential endogeneity problem of
contemporaneous changes in the dependent and explanatory variables
42.  rit–j
refers to the first difference of a nominal short-term interest rate and indicates
changes in the stance of monetary policy. Similarly to loans, ln(GDPit–j)
represents the growth rate of real GDP. ln(CPIit–j) in turn denotes the quarterly
inflation rate calculated as the growth rate of the consumer price index. The model
allows also for fixed effects, as indicated by the country-specific intercept ai,
whereas 	it refers to the time-varying residual. bj, cj, dj, ej, fj, g1j, g2j, g3j, hj, k1j, k2j,
k3j, mj, n1j, n2j and n3j are the parameter coefficients to be estimated from the
model.
The inclusion of GDP growth and inflation in the model is assumed to capture
loan demand effects by reflecting changes in the general macroeconomic
environment. That is, the inclusion of macroeconomic variables in the model is
assumed to account for the relevant time effects, whereas the distributional effects
across countries should be reflected in significant coefficients on the interaction
terms of the country-specific characteristics with the monetary policy indicator.
For the sake of simplicity, the model estimated here is reduced and modified
further into a form (6.12)
                                                
42 The so-called endogeneity problem arises when the values of the explanatory variables are
affected by the mechanism described by the model. This may be the case eg when a change in the
price of an object is used in explaining a contemporary change in the quantity demanded. In order
to avoid the problem, the explanatory variables must be either exogenous (ie variables whose
values are completely determined outside the model) or lagged endogenous variables (ie variables
whose values are represented by the past values of the endogenous variable of the model).
(Kmenta 1986, 651–653)81
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where other interaction terms than those including the interest rate are being
ignored. Inclusion of all interactions could create a multicollinearity problem of
correlated explanatory variables and thus lead to a lack of statistical significance
of the coefficient estimates. In addition, the interest rate is entered into the model
as a level variable instead of a change in order to further simplify the mechanisms.
In the long run, both the endogenous variable and the exogenous variables are
assumed to grow steadily, so that t = t+1 = t+2 … etc. That is, in the long run,
loan supply and real GDP are assumed to be growing at a constant rate from one
quarter to another and, likewise, prices to be rising steadily. Since the interest rate
is entered as a level variable, it is assumed to be constant in the long term.
Consequently, the long-run coefficients can be calculated as the sum of the
estimated coefficients of the lags of the exogenous variables, divided by one
minus the sum of the coefficients bj on the lagged endogenous variables.















Finally, the basic interpretation of the model can be stated as follows:
– Other things being equal, the higher the interest rate level, the slower should
be the growth rate of lending, provided that the long-run coefficient c is
negative
43.
– Statistically significant coefficients g, k and n on interaction terms imply that
the effect of an interest rate change on the growth rate of lending does depend
on the country-specific variables.
– Signs of the coefficients g, k and n tell whether an increase in the respective
characteristic variable increases or decreases the effect of an interest rate
change.
                                                
43 In the Ehrmann et al model, the greater the increase in the interest rate, the slower the growth
rate of lending, when c < 0.82
6.2 Estimation method
To begin with, a basic model with neither lagged dependent variables nor
characteristic variables and their interaction terms is estimated as a fixed-effects
(within) model by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method.
44 The lagged
dependent variables are dropped from the equation, since their presence would
bias the OLS estimators due to the correlation with the country-specific effects.
Furthermore, the model is estimated in four lags but the contemporaneous
variables are ignored in order to avoid the potential endogeneity problem.
Thereby, the goal is to first clarify the fundamental dynamics of the data in the
simplified model of the form:
















In the model, ai + 	it (i = 1,…,12) is the residual in the sense that the main interest
is in estimating the coefficients cj, dj and ej (j = 1,…,4). ai is the country-specific
time-invariant residual, so its value varies across countries but is constant over
time for any given country. 	it in turn is the standard residual assumed to satisfy
the four Gaus-Markov conditions
45. Then from (6.14), it follows that
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(6.15)
where the ‘upper bar’ refers to the value of the variable being equal to its mean
over the time period considered. Subtracting (6.15) from (6.14) yields a
transformation
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which is the final form of the model to be estimated by OLS. In (6.16) each
variable is expressed in terms of its deviation from the country-specific mean over
                                                
44 The discussion on estimation methods is based on Bond (2002) and the Reference Manual
(2001) for the statistical software package Stata.
45 According to the Gaus-Markov conditions, the error term should have an expected value of zero
and constant variance for all observations. Moreover, error terms of any two observations should
be uncorrelated and the explanatory variables nonstochastic.83
time, as a result of which the individual fixed effects ai are wiped out from the
equation. Estimating this fixed-effects model by OLS produces the within
estimates for the regression coefficients reported in the next section (model 1 in
table 16).
Even in the transformed model, from which the country-specific effects have
been removed, the presence of lagged dependent variables causes bias, now due to
negative correlation with the transformed error terms. A model of this form
(equation 6.17, model 2 in table 16) is estimated, however, in order to allow for
the comparison between the results.
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Since the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables makes
the OLS estimators biased, the model is estimated also by the generalised method
of moments (GMM) for panel data analysis. The method suggested by Arellano
and Bond (1991) is often used in estimating dynamic panel data models, since it
gives efficient and consistent estimates, provided that the serial correlation
properties of the model are taken into account properly.
The Arellano-Bond method takes first differences of the original model, so
like the fixed-effects OLS, it eliminates the country-specific effects from the
model. An important distinction between the two methods is, however, that unlike
the within transformation where the average error,  it  , is in the error term of the
transformed equation for quarter t, first-differencing does not introduce all
realisations of the errors (	it,…,	iT) into the transformed error term:
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After differencing the equation into the form (6.18), lagged values of endogenous
variables can be used as instruments in the estimation. If the error term in
(growth) levels is serially uncorrelated, then the error term in first differences is84
MA(1), so that instruments dated t–2 and earlier should be valid in the differenced
equation. Under this assumption consistent parameter estimates can be obtained.
On the other hand, if the error term in (growth) levels is itself MA(1), then only
instruments dated t–3 and earlier will be valid, and so on.
46 Models 3–7 are
estimated using this Arellano-Bond method varying the set of explanatory
variables.
One further note must be made, however, concerning the method and data
used. The Arellano-Bond method is best suited to panels where typically a large
number of individuals, eg banks or firms, is observed for a small number of time
periods, whereas the data used here is of quite the opposite form, as is described
below. However, since lengthening the estimation period increases the number of
valid instruments and thus leads to better estimates, it is mainly the small number
of cross-sectional observations that may give rise to concern from the
methodological point of view.
6.3 Data and construction of variables
The models are estimated using data derived from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics database, ETLA’s Economic Database (containing OECD
time series), and Reuters.
47 The unbalanced panel covers twelve countries, seven
variables and, at most, the years 1975–1998 on a quarterly basis, ie the sample
size differs across countries, as shown in table 14
48. Owing to the inclusion of
lagged values as explanatory variables, estimation periods are slightly shorter than
the initial data coverage. The sample countries comprise Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain and, outside
EMU, the three EU countries Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg had to be dropped due to lack of adequate data.
The three non-EMU countries were included in order to make the size of the
sample larger but also since they are viewed as likely future members.
                                                
46 Reasons for the use of the Arellano-Bond method are similar to those given in Topi and
Vilmunen (2001), for example.
47 For a more detailed description of data sources and variable definitions, see appendix 1.
Variables are presented in figures in appendix 2.
48 For many countries, the time dimension of the data is limited primarily due to shortness of the
interest rate series available. The post-1999 data is ignored due to a break in the comparability of
figures. The definition of banking institutions was changed in the IMF’s IFS along with Stage
Three of EMU, in addition to which the potential regime shift in the macroeconomic environment
could make a difference.85
Table 14. Initial data coverage by country













Variables are defined as in table 15, where the first column gives the ex ante
expected signs (+ or –) of the coefficient estimates. Loans refer to loans of
domestic banking institutions (deposit banks) to private nonfinancial sector of the
economy. The seasonally adjusted real GDP is used, since there is no clear
seasonality in the dependent variable either. Moreover, the volume index is used
instead of real values, since the former is more readily available. Thus the GDP
volume index accounts for the growth in real terms, while the CPI reflects
changes in prices.
3-month money market interest rates are quarterly averages of daily
observations of country-specific nominal 3-month money market rates and they
are used as monetary policy indicators
49. This raises some concerns, however, in
particular when considering the length of the estimation period. It is highly
unlikely that in the course of decades the short-term interest rates have always
reflected the stance of prevailing monetary policies. Nevertheless, they are the
only relevant indicators available for the periods and countries considered.
When the long-run coefficients are calculated, coefficients for the lags of
GDP growth and inflation should both sum to a positive number, whereas the
interest rate should enter negatively.
                                                
49 For example for Finland, the money market rate used is the 3-month Helibor in 1987–1998, and
prior to that the markka (FIM) forward interest rate.86
Table 15. Definitions of variables and the ex ante
assumptions on the signs of their coefficients
Expected sign Variable Definition
ln(L) First difference of logs of loans of domestic banking
institutions to the domestic private sector
+ ln(GDP) First difference of logs of real GDP volume, seasonally
adjusted
– r A 3-month nominal money market rate
+ ln(CPI) First difference of logs of CPI
+/– x Total bank assets divided by GDP, ‘size’
+/– xr Interaction term of ‘size’ and the interest rate
+ y Deposits divided by total bank assets, ‘liquidity’
+ yr Interaction term of ‘liquidity’ and the interest rate
+ z Capital and reserves divided by total bank assets,
‘capitalisation’
+ zr Interaction term of ‘capitalisation’ and the interest rate
National financial systems are characterised with three banking sector ratios. The
first describes the size of the banking sector relative to the size of the total
economy. The former is measured by total banking sector assets (claims for the
private sector and the central government) and the latter by GDP. The underlying
assumption made is that large banks should have fewer difficulties – due to lower
information costs and a lower external finance premium – in raising funds than
small banks. Thus the size of the bank is often used as a proxy for the
informational asymmetry that it faces.
However, in the aggregate, a large banking sector could follow from either a
large number of small banks or from few large banks. Thereby, it is not clear
whether a country with a large banking sector should be better able to offset
contractionary monetary policy actions than a country with a smaller banking
sector. Therefore, the ex ante assumption on the sign of the interaction coefficient
is not that obvious either. On one hand, if the banking sector is assumed to be
better able to insulate the changes in interest rates when the size of the sector is
larger, then the sign should be expected to be positive. But on the other hand, if
the reverse is true, then the sign should be negative reflecting the fact that the size
getting higher (ie x
) adds to the initial negative effect of an interest rate increase.
In the case of the other two indicators, the mechanism is expected to be less
obscure. The second indicator is calculated by dividing the sum of demand, time
and savings deposits by the total bank assets. The idea is simply that the more
banks have loanable funds relative to their outstanding claims, the better they
should be able to insulate the supply of loans from contractionary monetary
shocks. The third variable in turn characterises the degree of capitalisation by
comparing the amount of capital and reserves to total banking sector assets.
Again, the higher the ratio, the more readily banks should be able to draw on87
additional finance, ie reserves and other non-deposits. Consequently, the expected
signs are positive, ie the more liquid and better capitalised the banking system, the
better it should be able to absorb the shocks.
Variables xit, yit and zit used in estimations are constructed by calculating for
each initial value Xit, Yit and Zit of the characteristic variables, the deviation from
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This normalisation of variables with respect to their averages across countries
results in indicators that sum to zero over all observations. Then the average of
each interaction term equals zero as well, and consequently, the parameters cj can
directly be interpreted as the overall monetary policy effects on lending.
(Ehrmann et al 2001)
6.4 Estimation results
The estimated coefficients from seven slightly different models are depicted in
table 16 below
51, indicating the long-run effects for a country with the average
characteristics of the sample. Models 1–2 have been estimated as fixed-effects
(within) models using OLS, whereas in models 3–7 the Arellano-Bond method
has been used. Model 1 has no lagged dependent variables and it is therefore
referred to as ‘static’ in contrast to ‘dynamic’ models 2–7 in which also lagged
values of the endogenous variable are used as explanatory variables.
                                                
50 Since the panel is unbalanced, the number of countries in the sample may vary from a quarter to
another.
51 Estimations are conducted using the statistical analysis package Intercooled Stata 7.0, which
incorporates commands for both the fixed-effects and Arellano-Bond methods. For detailed test
results and other statistical diagnostics, see appendix 3.88
Table 16. Estimated long-run coefficients
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
r –0.115** –0.378*** –0.309*** –0.249*** –0.294*** –0.143*** –0.128***
ln(CPI) 0.941*** 1.197** 0.249 0.047 0.218 0.423* 0.379*




Sargan: p 0.9261 0.9416 0.9416 0.4748 0.5356
MA(1): p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MA(2): p 0.0116 0.0199 0.0182 0.0000 0.0000
* significant at 90% confidence level
** significant at 95% confidence level
*** significant at 99% confidence level
Model 1: fixed-effects (within) regression on a static model by OLS, lags 1–4
Model 2: fixed-effects (within) regression on a dynamic model by OLS, lags 1–4
Model 3: dynamic panel data estimation by Arellano-Bond method, lags 1–4
Model 4: dynamic panel data estimation by Arellano-Bond method, lags 1–4
Model 5: dynamic panel data estimation by Arellano-Bond method, lags 1–4
Model 6: dynamic panel data estimation by Arellano-Bond method, lags 1–3
Model 7: dynamic panel data estimation by Arellano-Bond method, lags 1–3
As shown in appendix 3, in model 1 only the fourth lag of the interest rate has a
statistically significant coefficient at a 95% confidence level. For the CPI change,
lags of 2 to 3 quarters have significant coefficients, whereas for the GDP growth
all four short-run coefficients turn out to be significant. Nevertheless, as shown in
table 16, the corresponding long-run coefficients are all satisfactorily significant,
so in the long term the underlying data seems to suit the model rather well. The
fact that the long-run coefficients are quite small suggests, however, that the
effects are somewhat weak. According to model 1, an increase of 100 basis points
in the interest rate reduces lending by –0.115%, whereas a 1% growth in GDP and
an equal rise in prices increase lending by 0.974% and 0.941%, respectively. The
interpretation is virtually the same in all seven models.
As to the signs of the long-run coefficients, the results seem to be robust to
small changes in model specifications. In all estimated models, an average
banking sector reacts to a monetary tightening by reducing loans, but the size of
the adjustment varies slightly between the models. The coefficient of the interest
rate variable is highly significant in all models, indicating that despite a priori
concerns about the explanatory power of the variable, it is seems to fit to the
model rather well.
The models seem to capture also the loan demand effects as the coefficient
estimates for GDP growth and inflation are signed as expected, with the
significance of the former being higher in all seven models. In fact, the CPI
growth is the only macroeconomic variable suffering from a considerable lack of
significance. In models 2–7, the high statistical significance of the coefficients on89
the lagged dependent variables reflects in turn the steady behaviour of lending.
That is, in most of the countries considered the loan stock has grown rather
steadily throughout the years.
The interaction terms of the interest rate and the country-specific variables are
included in models 4–7. In model 4, the sign of the interaction term for ‘size’ is
negative and highly significant, implying that a larger size of a banking sector, as
compared to the size of the respective total economy, strengthens the impact of a
monetary tightening. The effect of ‘liquidity’ in model 5 is instead negligible,
both in terms of its magnitude and in terms of its statistical significance.
Consequently, model 5 implies that the ratio of deposits to total outstanding
claims does not affect the extent to which lending reacts to changes in money
market rates. In model 6 in turn, the ratio of capital and reserves to total banking
sector assets is found to influence the supply of loans in the sense that the higher
the ratio, the better a banking sector is able to insulate its lending from monetary
policy shocks. Finally, model 7 incorporates the effect of both size and
capitalisation, with the estimates having the same signs as before. The effect of
the size of a banking sector is, however, considerably smaller than in model 4,
whereas the degree of capitalisation impacts slightly more as compared to model
6. Nevertheless, the fact that both size and capitalisation are significant in model 7
may imply that models incorporating only one the variables might suffer from an
omitted variable bias.
As shown in appendix 3, the more detailed estimation results report also the
value of a constant for each estimated model, unless it is explicitly set to zero. In
the models estimated using the Arellano-Bond method, the presence of a
statistically significant constant implies that the underlying non-differenced data
has a linear trend, ie a time variable running from quarter to another
(t = ti + 1, ti + 2,…,Ti) depending on the estimation period is question. Thereby, in
the first-differenced model the variable has a constant value of 1. For consistency
between models, a time variable has thus been added also to the fixed-effects
models to capture the underlying trend, which, in fact, turns out to be highly
significant.
A Wald test of the null hypothesis that all coefficients – except for the
constant – are zero is rejected in all specifications. For any of the dynamic models
estimated by the Arellano-Bond method, the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid (see the
probabilities in table 16). However, the Arellano-Bond tests for the presence of
first- and second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced residuals, MA(1) and
MA(2) respectively (see the two bottom rows in table 16), seem to suggest that
the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors in the level specification is not
entirely borne by the data. This may point to specification problems with the
model, although both the estimated dynamic short-run as well as the static long-
run coefficients are reasonable and of the expected sign and the model performs90
well otherwise. In conclusion, however, it is noted that the over-identifying
restrictions hold and the model specifications are found acceptable.
7 Conclusions
Understanding the mechanisms through which monetary shocks – particularly
changes in the key ECB interest rates – affect prices and the real economic
activity in the euro area is highly important for the successful conduct of the
common monetary policy. Since cross-country differences in output cost of
lowering inflation might require compensatory measures on the part of national
fiscal policies, considerable asymmetries in monetary transmission could
ultimately create political tensions within the Union.
Monetary transmission has long been a research topic of great interest in
macroeconomics, but it is only recently that the established theoretical framework
has been complemented by extensive empirical evidence for the main European
countries. Moreover, along with the adoption of the common currency, the focus
has being moving from differing shocks and their final effects within countries to
detecting cross-country asymmetries in responses to uniform monetary shocks.
Common to all theories of monetary transmission is the argument that policy-
induced changes in money supply influence the real economic activity, but the
specific channel through which the shocks are assumed to be transmitted varies
depending on the view. The traditional money view of monetary transmission
focuses on the direct impact of interest rates on consumption and investment
behaviour. Although considering a wider range of asset prices, such as exchange
rates and equity prices, has broadened this conventional view, it is still commonly
criticised for being overly simplistic, since it ignores banks as creditors.
The more recent lines of research have adopted the so-called credit view,
which in contrast to the money view emphasises the role of bank loans in the
monetary transmission process. Since the banking sector serves as the main source
of finance for both households and the majority of firms, changes in lending
should, according to this view, have consequences for total output through the
private sector spending. The channel divides further into two separate
mechanisms, of which the bank lending channel is based on the impact of
monetary policy on banks’ balance sheets, whereas the balance sheet channel
operates through changes in borrowers’ financial positions. Thereby, the former is
related to banks’ ability and the latter to their willingness to supply loans for the
nonfinancial private sector.
The variety of transmission mechanisms suggests that the potency of
monetary policy may depend on several country-specific factors. On the basis of
descriptive cross-country comparisons, the current Member States seem to differ91
quite considerably in terms of their financial systems, but the knowledge of
differences between countries does not easily translate into robust conclusions
about the likely impact of monetary policy. It is likely, however, that structural
differences between economies result in asymmetries in their responses to
monetary policy actions. In particular, differences in the amount and composition
of the assets and liabilities of banks, households and firms may have a bearing in
the degree of their interest rate sensitivity.
Most econometric analyses support the view that the prevailing differences
between countries have some impact on the extent to which the ECB’s monetary
policy influences the individual euro area countries. The evidence is mixed,
however, in the sense that the estimated magnitude of the effect of a given
monetary shock varies considerably depending on the models and methods used,
and even the ranking of countries with respect to their responses is inconsistent
between different types of studies. Furthermore, since the economic and financial
structures are constantly in a gradual change, the underlying dynamics within the
Eurosystem are also changing continuously, making the past evidence less
relevant.
In this thesis, a reduced-form model of the bank loan market was estimated on
the macro-level cross-country data, with the purpose of examining whether
characteristics of national financial systems affect the extent to which banks in the
aggregate are able to insulate their lending from interest rate changes. Results on a
panel of twelve EU countries indicate some support in favour of the bank lending
channel and asymmetric responses across countries. A larger size of the domestic
banking sector, as compared to the size of the total economy, was found to
strengthen the impact of interest rate changes on lending, whereas the reverse was
implied for the ratio of capital and reserves to total banking sector assets. In other
words, according to the results, the smaller and better capitalised the banking
system, the better it should be able to absorb policy-induced monetary shocks. On
the other hand, as to the value of deposits with respect to the banking sector’s
outstanding claims, there was no impact on lending observable.
In addition to supply side factors, demand effects were captured in the model
through inflation and real GDP growth, with the latter having a considerably
greater significance. All in all, the estimated long-run coefficients were, however,
rather small reflecting thereby either weakness of the effects or shortcomings in
the underlying data. One plausible explanation might be the use of aggregated
cross-country data, since the lack of micro-level disaggregation may suppress
some of the asymmetries found within countries.
Despite the huge differences in the relative importance of Member States in
terms of their impact on the weighted-average inflation and other euro area
aggregates, each member in the ECB’s Governing Council has an equal
opportunity to influence the interest rate decisions. Due to its strong commitment
to aggregate-level objectives, the Council will continuously have to trade off92
between the asymmetric consequences of its decisions on the individual Member
States. The research on the area may give some guidelines for how the weighting
between consequences should be done, but the final outcome remains always
uncertain. All in all, the Eurosystem’s operational framework has been
functioning rather well, although the sluggish economic growth has recently
questioned the chosen strategy of focusing only on inflation.
Since the existing empirical evidence is mostly based on data prior to 1999, it
has been yet too early for assessing whether the national transmission mechanisms
have changed or will change due to the adoption of the common currency. It is
expected, however, that countries become more and more alike in terms of their
economic and financial structures, the longer they operate within the Union.
Nevertheless, for example the potential eastern enlargement of EMU in the near
future would clearly result in an enormous increase in the degree of heterogeneity
among members. Moreover, it would further strengthen the dominance of small
economies in the ECB’s decision making body, unless, as is planned, the present
‘one member – one vote’ principle is changed. It thereby remains to be seen how
changes in the euro area will reciprocally affect the conduct of monetary policy.93
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Appendix 1
Data sources and description
Tables A1.1 and A1.2 below show the series codes and a more detailed
description of the variables derived from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics database, OECD’s Main Economic Indicators, and Reuters.
Table A1.1 Detailed data sources
Variable Country Source (Series code)
Euro area countries (excl. ES),
DK, SE, UK
IMF / IFS (22D..ZF…) Credit to the domestic private
sector by domestic banking
institutions ES IMF / IFS (32D..ZF…)
3-month money market rate All countries Reuters / BoF database
GDP volume index 1995 =
100, seasonally adjusted
All countries OECD. Main Economic
Indicators / Etla database
Consumer price index All countries IMF / IFS (64…ZF…)
Total assets (size)
– Claims on central
government
All countries (excl. UK) IMF / IFS (22A..ZF..)
– –“– (net) UK IMF / IFS (22AN.ZF…)
– Claims on private sector All countries (22D..ZF… / 32D..ZF…)
Deposits (liquidity)
– Demand deposits All countries (excl. SE, UK) IMF / IFS (24…ZF…)
– Time and saving deposits All countries (excl. SE, UK) IMF / IFS (25…ZF…)
– Total deposits SE, UK IMF / IFS (25L…ZF…)
Capital and reserves
(capitalisation)
– Reserves All countries IMF / IFS (20…ZF…)
– Capital accounts All countries (missing for UK) IMF / IFS (27A..ZF…)
GDP AU, BE, FI, PT, SE, DK IMF / IFS (99B..ZF…)
GDP s.a. FR, DE, IT, NL, ES, UK IMF / IFS (99B.CZF…)101
Table A1.2 Classification of banking institutions by country,
prior to 1999
Country Banking institutions (Deposit banks)
AU Joint stock, private, savings, and mortgage banks, agricultural credit associations,
industrial credit corporations, post office savings banks, miscellaneous other credit
institutions, and branches of Austrian banks resident outside Austria
BE Commercial banks
DK Commercial banks and other monetary institutions, ie the major savings bank and
accounts of the postal checking system
– December 1987  the accounts of the deposit money banks exclude the accounts
of their non-resident branches
– 1990   deposit money banks’ claims on other banking institutions and local
governments are included in claims on private sector (22d)
– The accounts of the deposit money banks were completely restructured from
January 1991
– June 1991  the accounts of the deposit money banks include the postal giro
system
FI Commercial banks, co-operative banks, savings banks, and branches of foreign credit
institutions engaged in deposit-taking activities in Finland
FR The accounts of the commercial banks, the specialised banks, and the private sector
deposits with the Postal System and Treasury of Metropolitan France and Monaco
DE The consolidated accounts of commercial banks, specialised banks, savings banks,
commercial and agricultural credit co-operatives, private and public mortgage banks,
the postal banking system, and private and public building societies
IT Commercial banks
NL Postbank, the Bank for Netherlands Municipalities, the Netherlands Polder Boards
Banks, and the universal banks, as well as security credit institutions, savings banks,
and mortgage banks that are subsidiaries of universal banks
PT All banks except saving banks and mutual agricultural credit banks, which are
classified as non-bank financial institutions
ES All resident units classified as other monetary financial institutions (MFIs), defined in
accordance with 1995 ESA standards, including money market funds
SE Commercial banks, large savings banks, co-operative banks, and deposit liabilities to
the private sector of the postal giro system
– Break in comparability with figures prior to 1996 due to the adoption of the
European Union accounting system
UK UK banks authorised under the Banking Act of 1987, and, beginning in January 1987,
building societies as defined by the Building Societies Act of 1986
– Break in comparability with figures prior to September 1992 due to the introduction
of a new balance sheet report form for the building society sector
– Break in comparability with figures prior to September 1997 due to the inclusion of
the accounts of certain institutions in Channel Islands and the Isle of Man to the UK
banking institutions sector
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics.102
Appendix 2
Graphics
Figure A2.1 Loans to the domestic private sector by domestic




















































Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics.103






























































Source: Calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
Figure A2.3 Quarterly average of a 3-month nominal money
market rate (%), 1972Q1–1998Q4

















































































































































































Source: OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.105


































































Source: Calculations based on OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.






















































Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics.106






















































Source: Calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.




















































Source: Calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.107



























































Source: Calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.























































Source: Calculations based on the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.108
Appendix 3
Detailed estimation results
All estimations have been carried out using Stata 7 procedures.
Model 1 (The basic model as an OLS fixed-effects model estimated using xtreg, fe
procedure)
. xtreg d1lnl r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 d1lncpi_1 d1lncpi_2 d1lncpi_3 d1lncpi_4 d1lngdp_1
d1lngdp_2 d1lngdp_3 d1lngdp_4 trend, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       699
Group variable (i) : i                          Number of groups   =        12
R-sq:  within  = 0.1406                         Obs per group: min =        19
       between = 0.0216                                        avg =      58.3
       overall = 0.1312                                        max =        91
                                                F(13,674)          =      8.48
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0679                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   d1lnloans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         r_1 |  -.0023287   .0663332    -0.04   0.972    -.1325734    .1279159
         r_2 |  -.0273701   .0802121    -0.34   0.733    -.1848656    .1301255
         r_3 |   .0644963   .0777988     0.83   0.407    -.0882608    .2172535
         r_4 |  -.1497077    .059887    -2.50   0.013    -.2672951   -.0321202
   d1lncpi_1 |   .2413014   .1478111     1.63   0.103    -.0489241    .5315269
   d1lncpi_2 |   .3470377   .1483908     2.34   0.020     .0556739    .6384014
   d1lncpi_3 |    .320581   .1504986     2.13   0.034     .0250784    .6160835
   d1lncpi_4 |   .0319488   .1491494     0.21   0.830    -.2609045    .3248022
   d1lngdp_1 |   .2367469    .086744     2.73   0.007     .0664258    .4070679
   d1lngdp_2 |   .1720764   .0862592     1.99   0.046     .0027074    .3414454
   d1lngdp_3 |   .3014185   .0855007     3.53   0.000     .1335388    .4692982
   d1lngdp_4 |   .2637977    .083493     3.16   0.002       .09986    .4277355
       trend |  -.0001652   .0000634    -2.61   0.009    -.0002897   -.0000407
       _cons |   .0349301   .0103052     3.39   0.001     .0146961    .0551642
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  .00913908
     sigma_e |  .02367418
         rho |  .12969579   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 674) =     3.83             Prob > F = 0.0000
Long-run coefficients and their standard errors with lincom procedure:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       d1lnl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       _cons |   .0349301   .0103052     3.39   0.001     .0146961    .0551642
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           r |  -.1149101   .0453653    -2.53   0.012    -.2039845   -.0258357
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     d1lncpi |   .9408689   .2360363     3.99   0.000      .477414    1.404324
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     d1lngdp |   .9740395   .1651648     5.90   0.000       .64974    1.298339
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       trend |  -.0001652   .0000634    -2.61   0.009    -.0002897   -.0000407
------------------------------------------------------------------------------109
Model 2 (A dynamic version of the basic model estimated using xtreg, fe procedure)
. xtreg d1lnl d1lnl_1 d1lnl_2 d1lnl_3 d1lnl_4 r_1 r_2 r_3 r_4 d1lncpi_1 d1lncpi_2
d1lncpi_3 d1lncpi_4 d1lngdp_1 d1lngdp_2 d1lngdp_3 d1lngdp_4 trend, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       699
Group variable (i) : i                          Number of groups   =        12
R-sq:  within  = 0.4228                         Obs per group: min =        19
       between = 0.7515                                        avg =      58.3
       overall = 0.4349                                        max =        91
                                                F(17,670)          =     28.87
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0288                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   d1lnloans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     d1lnl_1 |  -.0075631   .0341967    -0.22   0.825    -.0747087    .0595824
     d1lnl_2 |   .1884066   .0338878     5.56   0.000     .1218676    .2549457
     d1lnl_3 |  -.0283922   .0339523    -0.84   0.403    -.0950578    .0382734
     d1lnl_4 |   .4637613   .0341875    13.57   0.000     .3966338    .5308889
         r_1 |  -.1105306   .0551524    -2.00   0.045    -.2188229   -.0022382
         r_2 |   .0479665   .0666653     0.72   0.472    -.0829316    .1788646
         r_3 |  -.0180212   .0646243    -0.28   0.780    -.1449116    .1088693
         r_4 |  -.0644846   .0497574    -1.30   0.195    -.1621837    .0332146
   d1lncpi_1 |   .0337921   .1230347     0.27   0.784    -.2077878     .275372
   d1lncpi_2 |   .1903506   .1231247     1.55   0.123    -.0514061    .4321073
   d1lncpi_3 |   .2011059     .12453     1.61   0.107    -.0434102    .4456219
   d1lncpi_4 |   .0339873   .1235992     0.27   0.783    -.2087011    .2766757
   d1lngdp_1 |   .1003141   .0721546     1.39   0.165    -.0413624    .2419905
   d1lngdp_2 |   .1252569   .0717796     1.75   0.081    -.0156831    .2661969
   d1lngdp_3 |   .2582073   .0711305     3.63   0.000     .1185419    .3978728
   d1lngdp_4 |   .1690122   .0697306     2.42   0.016     .0320953    .3059291
       trend |  -.0001214   .0000524    -2.32   0.021    -.0002242   -.0000185
       _cons |    .026623   .0085411     3.12   0.002     .0098525    .0433935
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |   .0049588
     sigma_e |  .01945968
         rho |   .0609759   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(11, 670) =     1.38             Prob > F = 0.1754
Long-run coefficients and their standard errors with testnl procedure:
Variable Long-run
coefficient ) 1 (




constant 0.06936914 48.01 0.0000 0.01001153
r –0.37799523 11.36 0.0008 –0.11214945
CPI ln  1.1965894 5.54 0.0189 0.50838212
GDP ln  1.7009174 19.32 0.0000 0.38697211
trend –0.00031632 47.96 0.0000 –0.00004568110
Model 3 (A dynamic version of the basic model estimated using xtabond procedure)
. xtabond d1lnl l(1/4).(r d1lncpi d1lngdp), lags(4) maxldep(8) maxlags(8)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       687
Group variable (i): i                           Number of groups   =        12
                                                Wald chi2(16)      =    381.45
Time variable (t): t                            min number of obs  =        18
                                                max number of obs  =        90
                                                mean number of obs =     57.25
One-step results
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnloans    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnl        |
          LD |  -.0690659   .0344195    -2.01   0.045    -.1365268   -.0016049
         L2D |   .1324007   .0338399     3.91   0.000     .0660757    .1987257
         L3D |  -.0702894   .0334648    -2.10   0.036    -.1358793   -.0046995
         L4D |   .4253175   .0335726    12.67   0.000     .3595164    .4911186
r            |
          LD |  -.0760708   .0535479    -1.42   0.155    -.1810229    .0288812
         L2D |    .034282   .0635084     0.54   0.589    -.0901921    .1587562
         L3D |  -.0214802    .061538    -0.35   0.727    -.1420925    .0991322
         L4D |  -.1161679   .0486565    -2.39   0.017    -.2115329   -.0208028
d1lncpi      |
          LD |  -.0452801   .1205246    -0.38   0.707    -.2815041    .1909439
         L2D |   .1174356   .1197694     0.98   0.327    -.1173081    .3521794
         L3D |   .1208462   .1215577     0.99   0.320    -.1174025    .3590949
         L4D |  -.0483862    .121829    -0.40   0.691    -.2871666    .1903942
d1lngdp      |
          LD |   .0917289   .0718931     1.28   0.202     -.049179    .2326368
         L2D |   .1264373    .071891     1.76   0.079    -.0144665     .267341
         L3D |   .2656741   .0708811     3.75   0.000     .1267498    .4045985
         L4D |    .203044   .0687982     2.95   0.003      .068202     .337886
_cons        |   -.000292   .0000727    -4.02   0.000    -.0004345   -.0001496
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:
         chi2(706) =   652.37     Prob > chi2 = 0.9261
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z = -16.26   Pr > z = 0.0000
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.53   Pr > z = 0.0116
Long-run coefficients and their standard errors with testnl procedure:
Variable Long-run
coefficient ) 1 (




constant –0.00050203 79.67 0.0000 –0.00005624
r –0.30850309 16.87 0.0000 –0.07511073
CPI ln  0.24863538 0.44 0.5068 0.37483194
GDP ln  0.74866981 18.01 0.0000 .18227738111
Model 4 (Interaction term of the interest rate and ‘size’ included, lags 1–4)
. xtabond d1lnl l(1/4).(r d1lncpi d1lngdp xr), lags(4) maxldep(8) maxlags(8)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       687
Group variable (i): i                           Number of groups   =        12
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =    402.09
Time variable (t): t                            min number of obs  =        18
                                                max number of obs  =        90
                                                mean number of obs =     57.25
One-step results
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnloans    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnl        |
          LD |  -.0779818   .0345003    -2.26   0.024    -.1456012   -.0103624
         L2D |   .1240565   .0339561     3.65   0.000     .0575037    .1906093
         L3D |  -.0599524   .0338805    -1.77   0.077     -.126357    .0064521
         L4D |   .4412589     .03392    13.01   0.000      .374777    .5077407
r            |
          LD |   -.058281   .0535101    -1.09   0.276    -.1631589    .0465969
         L2D |   .0431104   .0634175     0.68   0.497    -.0811857    .1674065
         L3D |  -.0182801   .0613853    -0.30   0.766    -.1385931    .1020329
         L4D |  -.1089061   .0485205    -2.24   0.025    -.2040045   -.0138076
d1lncpi      |
          LD |  -.0668293   .1208237    -0.55   0.580    -.3036395    .1699808
         L2D |   .0929729   .1199555     0.78   0.438    -.1421356    .3280814
         L3D |   .0748155   .1217668     0.61   0.539     -.163843    .3134741
         L4D |  -.0742713   .1221884    -0.61   0.543    -.3137563    .1652136
d1lngdp      |
          LD |   .0876051   .0721207     1.21   0.224    -.0537488     .228959
         L2D |   .1285841    .072017     1.79   0.074    -.0125666    .2697347
         L3D |   .2706324   .0708518     3.82   0.000     .1317654    .4094993
         L4D |   .1901863   .0689479     2.76   0.006     .0550508    .3253218
xr           |
          LD |  -.0516504   .0674985    -0.77   0.444     -.183945    .0806443
         L2D |  -.1085921   .0672277    -1.62   0.106     -.240356    .0231717
         L3D |  -.2243581   .0659655    -3.40   0.001    -.3536482    -.095068
         L4D |  -.1204952   .0649756    -1.85   0.064     -.247845    .0068547
_cons        |  -.0002826   .0000722    -3.91   0.000    -.0004242    -.000141
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:
         chi2(706) =   648.07     Prob > chi2 = 0.9416
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z = -16.13   Pr > z = 0.0000
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.33   Pr > z = 0.0199
Long-run coefficients and their standard errors with testnl procedure:
Variable Long-run
coefficient ) 1 (




constant –0.00049352 76.59 0.0000 –0.00003229
r –0.24860641 10.86 0.0010 –0.07543926
CPI ln  0.04660646 0.01 0.9035 0.4660646
GDP ln  0.72046202 17.60 0.0000 0.1717334
xr –0.88208013 10.64 0.0011 –0.27041901112
Model 5 (Interaction term of the interest rate and ‘liquidity’ included, lags 1–4)
. xtabond d1lnl l(1/4).(r d1lncpi d1lngdp yr), lags(4) maxldep(8) maxlags(8)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       687
Group variable (i): i                           Number of groups   =        12
                                                Wald chi2(20)      =    384.05
Time variable (t): t                            min number of obs  =        18
                                                max number of obs  =        90
                                                mean number of obs =     57.25
One-step results
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnloans    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnl       |
          LD |  -.0747429    .034872    -2.14   0.032    -.1430907   -.0063951
         L2D |   .1355865   .0342887     3.95   0.000     .0683819    .2027911
         L3D |  -.0728068   .0339425    -2.15   0.032    -.1393328   -.0062807
         L4D |   .4218724    .034059    12.39   0.000     .3551181    .4886268
r            |
          LD |  -.0446519   .0568331    -0.79   0.432    -.1560428    .0667391
         L2D |  -.0162911   .0693071    -0.24   0.814    -.1521304    .1195483
         L3D |   .0008435   .0681886     0.01   0.990    -.1328038    .1344908
         L4D |  -.1131951   .0527564    -2.15   0.032    -.2165958   -.0097944
d1lncpi      |
          LD |  -.0672665   .1220662    -0.55   0.582    -.3065119    .1719788
         L2D |   .1170693   .1207437     0.97   0.332    -.1195841    .3537227
         L3D |   .1201537   .1221719     0.98   0.325    -.1192989    .3596063
         L4D |  -.0414523   .1223099    -0.34   0.735    -.2811753    .1982707
d1lngdp      |
          LD |   .0960427   .0736335     1.30   0.192    -.0482764    .2403618
         L2D |   .1275778   .0735197     1.74   0.083    -.0165183    .2716738
         L3D |   .2655982    .072697     3.65   0.000     .1231147    .4080817
         L4D |   .2161451   .0703016     3.07   0.002     .0783564    .3539337
yr           |
          LD |  -.3948789   .2832618    -1.39   0.163    -.9500618     .160304
         L2D |   .6535021   .3480857     1.88   0.060    -.0287334    1.335738
         L3D |  -.3548516   .3339386    -1.06   0.288    -1.009359    .2996559
         L4D |   .0985013   .2511782     0.39   0.695    -.3937989    .5908015
_cons        |  -.0002904   .0000785    -3.70   0.000    -.0004443   -.0001366
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:
         chi2(706) =   648.05     Prob > chi2 = 0.9416
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z = -16.40   Pr > z = 0.0000
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -2.36   Pr > z = 0.0182
Variable Long-run
coefficient ) 1 (




constant –0.00049213 77.24 0.0000 –0.000056
r –0.29367435 15.44 0.0001 –0.07473815
CPI ln  0.21777013 0.34 0.5587 0.37347269
GDP ln  0.75880932 17.23 0.0000 0.18280582
yr 0.00385181 0.00 0.9866 n.a.113
Model 6 (Interaction term of the interest rate and ‘capitalisation’ included, lags 1–3)
. xtabond d1lnl l(1/3).(r d1lncpi d1lngdp zr), lags(3) maxldep(8) maxlags(8)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       694
Group variable (i): i                           Number of groups   =        12
                                                Wald chi2(15)      =    226.92
Time variable (t): t                            min number of obs  =        19
                                                max number of obs  =        91
                                                mean number of obs =  57.83333
One-step results
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnloans    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnl        |
          LD |  -.1596299   .0362093    -4.41   0.000    -.2305989   -.0886609
         L2D |   .2588931   .0359073     7.21   0.000     .1885161    .3292701
         L3D |  -.0723963    .036418    -1.99   0.047    -.1437743   -.0010184
r            |
          LD |  -.0481092   .0559771    -0.86   0.390    -.1578223    .0616039
         L2D |  -.0142326   .0680602    -0.21   0.834    -.1476282     .119163
         L3D |  -.0771023   .0531422    -1.45   0.147    -.1812591    .0270544
d1lncpi      |
          LD |   .0265896   .1303376     0.20   0.838    -.2288675    .2820466
         L2D |   .1767122   .1294872     1.36   0.172    -.0770779    .4305024
         L3D |   .2081997   .1327754     1.57   0.117    -.0520353    .4684346
d1lngdp      |
          LD |   .2833838   .0770912     3.68   0.000     .1322878    .4344798
         L2D |   .1472253   .0774888     1.90   0.057    -.0046499    .2991005
         L3D |   .2396836   .0752695     3.18   0.001     .0921582    .3872091
zr           |
          LD |  -1.262733   .3030946    -4.17   0.000    -1.856787   -.6686783
         L2D |    1.11092   .3630763     3.06   0.002     .3993035    1.822536
         L3D |    .851572   .3356018     2.54   0.011     .1938046    1.509339
_cons        |  -.0002891   .0000804    -3.59   0.000    -.0004467   -.0001314
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:
         chi2(710) =   711.72     Prob > chi2 = 0.4748
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z = -17.62   Pr > z = 0.0000
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -9.05   Pr > z = 0.0000
Long-run coefficients and their standard errors with testnl procedure:
Variable Long-run
coefficient ) 1 (




constant –0.00029708 234.97 0.0000 –0.00001938
r –0.14329399 11.39 0.0007 –0.04245864
CPI ln  0.42286243 3.83 0.0503 0.21607261
GDP ln  0.68879866 21.12 0.0000 0.14988057
zr 0.7190784 7.07 0.0078 0.27043727114
Model 7 (Interaction with ‘size’ and ‘capitalisation’ included, lags 1–3)
. xtabond d1lnl l(1/3).(r d1lncpi d1lngdp xr zr), lags(3) maxldep(8) maxlags(8)
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data                Number of obs      =       694
Group variable (i): i                           Number of groups   =        12
                                                Wald chi2(18)      =    237.53
Time variable (t): t                            min number of obs  =        19
                                                max number of obs  =        91
                                                mean number of obs =  57.83333
One-step results
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnloans    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1lnl        |
          LD |  -.1598328    .036355    -4.40   0.000    -.2310873   -.0885783
         L2D |   .2606295   .0360861     7.22   0.000      .189902    .3313571
         L3D |  -.0578903   .0368456    -1.57   0.116    -.1301063    .0143258
r            |
          LD |  -.0410271   .0562396    -0.73   0.466    -.1512546    .0692004
         L2D |  -.0057926   .0681389    -0.09   0.932    -.1393424    .1277571
         L3D |  -.0753234    .053167    -1.42   0.157    -.1795289     .028882
d1lncpi      |
          LD |   .0008265    .130868     0.01   0.995      -.25567    .2573231
         L2D |   .1666674   .1301852     1.28   0.200    -.0884909    .4218257
         L3D |   .1951239   .1333656     1.46   0.143     -.066268    .4565157
d1lngdp      |
          LD |   .2989188   .0772634     3.87   0.000     .1474854    .4503522
         L2D |   .1419726   .0776811     1.83   0.068    -.0102795    .2942248
         L3D |   .2341911   .0753978     3.11   0.002      .086414    .3819681
xr           |
          LD |  -.1919251   .0716109    -2.68   0.007    -.3322799   -.0515704
         L2D |  -.0336147   .0717515    -0.47   0.639    -.1742451    .1070157
         L3D |  -.0852346   .0704398    -1.21   0.226     -.223294    .0528248
zr           |
          LD |  -1.187052   .3040391    -3.90   0.000    -1.782958   -.5911462
         L2D |   1.004942   .3646565     2.76   0.006     .2902285    1.719656
         L3D |   .8885994   .3358107     2.65   0.008     .2304225    1.546776
_cons        |  -.0002748   .0000804    -3.42   0.001    -.0004323   -.0001172
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:
         chi2(710) =   705.98     Prob > chi2 = 0.5356
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z = -17.76   Pr > z = 0.0000
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:
         H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -8.77   Pr > z = 0.0000
Long-run coefficients and their standard errors with testnl procedure:
Variable Long-run
coefficient ) 1 (




constant –0.00028712 223.49 0.0000 –0.00001921
r –0.12761887 8.48 0.0036 –0.0438245
CPI ln  0.37887399 2.94 0.0864 0.2209638
GDP ln  0.70534649 21.37 0.0000 0.15258093
xr –0.32470642 5.28 0.0215 –0.14131033
zr 0.73816153 7.23 0.0072 0.27452523BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS
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